E. M. CAMPBELL-ON INSTINCT. 
123 
these unconscious actions, or doing more than point out the frequent 
cases of children inheriting from their parents, or indeed from some 
more remote ancestor, little habits or nervous tricks which are 
performed unconsciously and are frequently most difficult to control. 
I will now continue my remarks on “ Instinct ” as exhibited in 
animals with nerves and muscles. In this relation an interest is 
attached to the first appearance of such structures in the animal 
kingdom. The motion of some of the Infusoria leads to the 
suspicion of their possessing nerve-fibres, and Engelmann entertains 
their presence in Stylonydhia mytilus * But it is only in the jelly¬ 
fishes that a nerve-structure and organs of a special sense, viz. 
sight, are generally accepted as first occurring. I cannot, however, 
help thinking that this instance of nerve-structure is more complex 
than might have been expected under the circumstances. Bomanes 
has studied these creatures, and found, by irritating the surface of the 
umbrella in some species, that the stick or manubrium was raised 
to the spot as if to remove some particle which had rested there, 
but he attributes this to reflex action.f He says that the Coelen- 
terata “ present no semblance of evidence that any of their re¬ 
sponsive movements are of a perceptive, or even of a conscious 
nature.” J The neuro-muscular structures of the Echinodermata 
(star-fishes) are more highly developed, and “ the ‘ acrobatic ’ and 
righting movements .... are, to say the least, strongly suggestive of 
true powers of perception.” § Let us then take the Echinodermata 
as a typical case of difficulty, and ask the question, Would an 
observer be justified in stating under any circumstances that these 
actions were instinctive? We cannot state that consciousness is 
always co-existent with nerve-structure. Morphology entirely 
fails in attempting such an analysis. All we know is that con¬ 
sciousness is located in the highest nerve-centres. Theoretically 
we may associate it with a confusion of impulses in a complexity 
of ganglia, but of this there is no proof. If, however, we have 
ascertained by careful observation that an animal has performed an 
intelligent action, we can credit it with consciousness, for that is 
the basis of all mental faculty. An intelligent action is the inten¬ 
tional adaptation of means to ends. But the intention, even in 
another human being, is not so easily ascertained. Adjustment to 
new conditions is a satisfactory test, but the difficulty arises of being 
sure that they are new, and that the adjustment is not an accidental 
application or modification of an old habit. The best evidence is 
the profiting by experience. Let us suppose, for argument’s sake, 
that we have satisfied ourselves by this latter means that the 
Echinodermata are intelligent, and therefore are conscious. We 
should still not be justified in describing any particular action of an 
individual as associated with the mental element; and if not associated 
with the mental element, according to the definition of Bomanes, it 
would not be instinctive. If the illustration I gave of a reflex 
action, viz. unconsciously stopping in front of a chair while walking 
* Pfluger’s £ Archive. Phys.,’ Band xxiii, 1880, p. 530. 
t ‘ Mental Evolution in Animals,’ p. 83. \ lb., p. 348. § lb., p. 348. 
