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THE 7 ELECT A PH 
country, and the soldiers stationed along it have to defend it 
against the enemy. 
Only the commander-in-chief, the commander of divisions 
of the army, and the head staff officers have the right to send 
telegraphic messages. These have to be written, for no verbal 
order can be accepted, and the telegraphic operator may insist 
upon this formality, by which he avoids personal responsibility. 
It is not always an easy matter to forward a telegraphic 
message from the field of battle. It is generally brought by 
a staff officer, and the rule adopted in other circumstances (of 
confirming the telegrams by letters within twenty-four hours) 
is also followed in actual warfare. 
The messages are, of course, centralized at the flying station 
which accompanies the commander-in-chief, and -the import¬ 
ance of this station in the circumstances of warfare will be 
easily understood. The use of cypher prevents the matter of 
the messages from being improperly revealed, and there is a 
special official whose duty is to translate the cypher. It would, 
of course, otherwise be possible to “ tap ” the line and become 
acquainted with the messages. By merely holding in the 
hand or placing in the mouth a wire derived from the main 
one, sounds may be heard and the signals be read by an expert. 
A message in ordinary language may thus become known by 
the enemy through the agency of a telegraphic operator. 
During the Secession War in the United States messages were 
several times “ tapped ” in this way. 
The staff of military telegraphists should comprise four 
operators for each section and twelve or fourteen for the 
central station. It has been calculated that for an army of 
80,000 men, there would be needed 15 officers, 500 men, 
280 horses, and 50 carriages, capable of carrying about 300 
miles of line. This would constitute a telegraphic brigade. 
Our readers will doubtless be interested in the remarks 
made by M. Chauvin in a paper read before the Society of 
Telegraphic Engineers of London, concerning the results of 
military telegraphy as used by the Prussian army in France, 
in 1870. He first reminds us that in the campaign against 
Austria in 1866 it was well-nigh demonstrated that modem 
warfare is impossible without the aid of the electric telegraph 
on the battle-field. In Prussia, before the war broke out, a 
