EXTRACT FROM THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR, 1855. 
9 
it as a narrow slope of an average width of less than one hundred and fifty miles of cultivable 
land, shirting the ocean for a distance of one thousand miles ; rich in those mineral productions 
which are tempting even beyond their value, and which would be most readily turned to the 
use of an invader ; drained by two rivers of wide-spread branches, and with seaports lying so 
directly upon the ocean that a hostile fleet could commence an attack upon any one of them 
within a few hours after being descried from land ; or, if fortified against attack, so few in 
number that comparatively few ships would suffice to blockade them. 
This territory is not more remote from the principal European States than from those parts 
of our own country whence it would derive its military supplies, and some of those States have 
colonies and possessions on the Pacific which would greatly facilitate their operations against 
it. With these advantages, and those which the attacking force always has of choice of time 
and place, an enemy possessing a considerable military marine could, with comparatively little 
cost to himself, subject us to enormous expenses, in giving to our Pacific frontier that protec¬ 
tion which it is the duty of the general government to afford. 
In the first years of a war with any great maritime power, the communication by sea could 
not he relied upon for the transportation of supplies from the Atlantic to the Pacific States. 
Our naval peace establishment would not furnish adequate convoys for the number of store- 
ships which it would he necessary to employ, and storeships alone laden with supplies could 
not undertake a voyage of twenty thousand miles, passing numerous neutral ports, where an 
enemy’s armed vessels, even of the smallest size, might lie in wait to intercept them. 
The only line of communication, then, would he overland; and by this it would he im¬ 
practicable, with any means heretofore used, to furnish the amount of supplies required for the 
defence of the Pacific frontier. At the present prices over the best part of this route the ex¬ 
pense of land transportation alone for the annual supplies of provisions, clothing, camp 
equipage, and ammunition for such an army as it would he necessary to maintain there, would 
exceed $20,000,000 ; and to maintain troops and carry on defensive operations under those 
circumstances, the expense per man would be six times greater than it is now ; the land 
transportation of each field twelve-pounder, with a due supply of ammunition for one year, 
would cost $2,500 ; of each 24-pounder and ammunition, $9,000 ; and of a seacoast gun and 
ammunition, $12,000. The transportation of ammunition for a year for 1,000 seacoast guns 
would cost $10,000,000. But the expense of transportation would be vastly increased by a 
war ; and at the rates that were paid on the northern frontier during the last war with G-reat 
Britain, the above estimates would be trebled. The time required for the overland journey 
would be from four to six months. In point of fact, however, supplies for such an army could 
not be transported across the continent. • On the arid and barx-en belts to be crossed, the 
limited quantities of water and grass would soon be exhausted by the numerous draught 
animals required for heavy trains, and over such distances forage could not be carried for their 
subsistence. 
On the other hand, the enemy would send out his supplies at from one-seventh to one- 
twentieth the above rates, and in less time—perhaps in one-fourth the time—if he should 
obtain command of the isthmus routes. 
Any reliance, therefore, upon furnishing that part of our frontier with means of defence 
from, the Atlantic and interior States, after the commencement of hostilities, would be vain, 
and the next resource would be to accumulate there such amount of stores and supplies as 
would suffice during the continuance of the contest, or until we could obtain command of the 
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