ARTILLERY IN THE FIELD. 
23 
only one position possible. I do not think that it would be possible 
(certainly not without frightful loss) to bring a battery into action in 
the open against artillery already in position that knows its range. I 
am speaking, of course, of modern skilled artillery. The experience 
of the Franco-German war showed that whole batteries were wiped 
out whilst attempting to come into action within sight of the enemy’s 
guns that were already in position. 
Failing the concealed position. —The thing a battery has to depend 
on is pace, and knowing the difficulty there is in making good practice 
on a rapidly moving target, I think that, under favourable circumstances, 
a rapid gallop up to a position over the last few hundred yards would 
probably save many a gun, especially if the battery be launched from 
a well concealed starting point. But, taken at the best, with an 
observant enemy it is a very difficult and dangerous operation. Once 
committed to it, there is no withdrawal. If the position has been re¬ 
connoitred the enemy has probably observed the party who went 
forward to do so, and arranged accordingly, and if it has not been re¬ 
connoitred, the probability is that it will prove disappointing—perhaps 
untenable. 
As to the drawbacks of the concealed position. If the objective has 
to be changed on to artillery in another position, nothing surely is 
easier than to relay aiming posts. And supposing the enemy’s guns 
to be silenced, or should there be reason so to do, the guns can be run 
up by hand into a more forward position whence the front can be more 
easily seen. 
The concealed position has a role of its own, and is, under certain 
aspects, most useful, and, I may say, indispensable ; but no artillery¬ 
man can consider it suitable for every phase , and it is astonishing to 
me to hear men speak as if its advocates ever endeavoured to argue 
that it was . Of one thing I am sure, that it wants much practice and 
that many batteries don’t practice it half enough. The difference 
shown by the batteries in this command in making use of it left no 
doubt in my mind as to who had and who had not. 
In supporting the infantry attack it must be borne in mind that to 
give real support to the infantry the guns must be pushed forward, 
and that, therefore, as soon as the fire of the enemy’s artillery has 
been subdued, be his position never so good , the commander of attacking 
artillery must push forward to a more advanced position, first, because the 
close presence of artillery gives infantry great confidence, and secondly, 
because if he does not, his fire will be sure to be masked by the 
advance of infantry earlier than it would otherwise be. Further, it is 
most important that the guns should be sufficiently advanced to take 
a part in the further developments of the engagement,To push forward 
if the attack be successful, to serve as a rallying point for the infantry 
inicase of a counter attack, or to cover their retirement in case^of 
repulse. 
To be able thus to push on without delay, the commander] should 
remember in taking up a position, to look well to his probable line of 
advance. Nothing can be more unfortunate than for artillery, when 
