24 
AETILLEEY IN THE EIELD. 
required to advance, to have to make a long detour. But one has 
often seen this the case ! 
It is always well, therefore, to have the ground in advance of the 
position as soon as possible reconnoitred by a scout, in view of a 
possible forward movement. 
Some officers of other arms regard the forward movement of guns 
in support of infantry as impracticable. So it would be, if the enemy's 
artillery were in position and unshaken. But we must remember (a) 
no infantry attack can take place unless the artillery duel has been 
decided in our favour; ( b ) with the artillery shattered and our infantry 
at their throats, the enemy’s infantry would not have much time to 
give to our advancing guns. 
Their cavalry, however, might try and take the guns in flank duriug 
their advance, and the Artillery Commander must be on the look-out 
for this. 
(b) Pursuing a retreating enemy. —Here the great object is to keep 
him going to prevent him from taking up good positions for defence. 
Much must, of course, depend on whether the retreat is orderly or a rout. 
In either case a bold game is the best, and risks may be run, which, 
otherwise would not be justifiable. 
(c) Resisting an attach. —In this case everything should be done to 
strengthen the position, if time would allow, as it probably would. All 
ranges should be at once taken and written down—the line of retreat 
well reconnoitred. A deadly source of danger to a position of this 
is a nullah or covered way leading up to, or near to, the position by 
which troops would be pressed forward without coming under fire of 
the battery. 
I have in my mind’s eye just such a case, and I was directed to take up 
such a position during some manoeuvres ; a broad road led through the 
middle of the position; it was absolutely hidden from sight until it 
came over the crest of a low rising ground some 300 yards from the 
guns. Half a dozen regiments might have come up unseen and rushed 
the batteries. I did not occupy the position, but I must admit that 
the umpires held that I was wrong in objecting to it for the un¬ 
answerable reason that other Brigade Division Commanders had taken 
up the position without protest! Possibly the experiences of Maiwand 
will say better than half a dozen umpires whether I was right or 
wrong. 
(i d) Covering our own retreat. —Of these positions it is most difficult 
to speak; the idea being to delay the pursuit and to allow others to 
draw off. They must depend enormously on the movements of those 
who are retiring as well as of those who are pursuing. 
In a rear guard action guns must be careful not to allow themselves 
to stay too long on a position, otherwise they may have to be extricated 
by the very infantry whose retirement they are endeavouring to cover. 
The great object is to make the enemy leave the roads and deploy— 
retard him in fact—and then retire to a further position and repeat 
the operation. 
In speaking of positions for larger bodies of Artillery, Brigade 
