150 
OUTPOSTS FOR COAST DEFENCE. 
often have to be taken by a junior officer is, I think, evident, if it is 
admitted that an attack or attempt to run past may take place (almost 
without warning) at any hour. Fire and Battery Commanders cannot 
always be at their posts and there should be some machinery for carry¬ 
ing on during their absence, and the system should be tested and 
rehearsed in peace time. 
The best number of reliefs, whether two or three, and the best 
system of dividing any given manning detail as to these reliefs, will 
depend very much on the nature of the work, the accommodation of the 
manning detail and whether it is composed of R.A., Militia or Volun¬ 
teers. The object to be kept in view in each case, is to make the 
transition from manning by relief to full manning as simple as possible 
while preserving the administrative units as intact as possible. I re¬ 
ferred above to a signalman, who was to assist the officer on look-out; 
the rank is not officially recognised, although the duties are :—The 
signalman should be the B.C/s. right hand man, he should have 
exceptional qualifications and be in receipt of exceptionally good pay 
for his special duties. He should be a semaphore signaller, understand 
the international code system, and be a telephonist as well. He should 
be quick at recognising ships and be acquainted with their leading 
characteristics. 
The officer on lookout duty should be in possession of all the memo¬ 
randa for the day, i. e. secret signals, a list of our men of war expected 
to leave or enter the port and any intelligence as to hostile movements 
that the F.C. may think fit to give him. He would take over from the 
officer he relieved, the log-book with all warnings sent or received as 
to the movements of ships. 
For the transmission of warnings to interior forts, direct communica¬ 
tion is necessary; in many fortresses, communication from one fort to 
another is through an exchange at head-quarters, but this route would 
not be good enough for warnings as the line from either of the forts to 
the exchange might be occupied with a message to or from head¬ 
quarters. To give the telephone operators power to send warnings, 
“X.X.B.” would be to give them the power to prevent the G.O.O. from 
sending orders to the forts, or to delay these orders which might be 
dangerous. The only way out of the difficulty (where there are a series 
of forts along an anchorage or estuary) is to have a line going direct 
from fort to fort, along which lines warning signals would always have 
priority. 
The best arrangement for the transmission of warnings from farther 
afield than the limits of vision from the outermost fort of any particu¬ 
lar fortress is a more difficult question. There is no doubt that in former 
times the system of beacon fires enabled the news of a hostile attack, 
or the presence of a hostile fleet, being passed rapidly over the country 
and that with all our improved means of communication, we have no 
organised system to replace the effective if somewhat primitive system 
that was used in troublous times before. On the other hand it seems 
doubtful whether it would be worth the expense to establish a system 
of out-look posts all round the coast, as a hostile fleet or ships would 
