THE ARTILLERY AT DARGAI. 
177 
cumstance tlicir fire was absolutely perfect, a steady spray of perfect 
shrapnel fire on some 300 yards of: front, now concentrating at one 
point now distributed over the whole line. The fire ceased for a short- 
while to allow the infantry to make their attempt, but was soon opened 
again and continued till about 3 p.m., a final burst of very rapid fire 
prefacing the advance of the Gordon Highlanders. 
Now to consider the effect of the fire. When our men gained the 
ridge, the enemy had disappeared and had removed their dead and 
wounded, but as their position sloped from the crest back and they 
had ample time, there was no reason to expect to find bodies. 
It has been said that the Afridi and Orakzai casualties were practically 
nil, and that the guns had little or no effect. This I venture to en¬ 
tirely disbelieve, what ever casualties there were, must have been 
almost entirely due to artillery fire for the enemy were absolutely pro¬ 
tected from the long range volleys fired by the Dorsets and Djrby- 
shires on the ridge A. 
After the fight, the 30 th Pan jab infantry held the Dargai ridge for 
some weeks, one of their officers told me that there were 34 large patches 
of gore in the enemy's sangers, and it is not every man hit who indulges 
in patches of gore, so much for the no casualty theory. 
I carefully examined the whole of the enemy's position and for 20 
feet below the crest and on every rock or ledge and sangar on it, there 
were two or three bidlet splashes per square foot at least for a front of 
300 yards. This was only what I expected from the appearance of 
the bursting shell as I watched them from Shinawari on the 20th. 
I have no doubt in my mind that the shrapnel fire must have in¬ 
flicted severe loss, no man of the enemy could hive stood there save 
under cover, and no troops in the world could have taken the position 
if the enemy had kept up the fire as it was at the commencement. 
That they had plenty of ammunition left was evident from the heavy 
week's firing that succeeded the Dargai fight while both divisions were 
concentrating at Karrappa. The heavy fire kept up during the middle 
of the day and the rapid burst previous to the Gordons' advance, must 
not only have inflicted considerable loss but have demonstrated to the 
enemy, that directly our troops should have got beyond B and hence 
more underneath them, when it would be necessary (for the enemy) to 
leave their head cover and lean over their breastworks to fire down, in 
so doing they would be annihilated by shrapnel fire. The guns 
though silent were ready to open fire again directly the infantry were 
severely checked. To my mind this as much as anything else con¬ 
tributed to the enemy's timely flight, and our loss would have been 
twice or thrice as heavy if they had not fled till the last moment, in¬ 
deed I doubt if the position could have been carried. 
The artillery fire also cleared a number of the enemy out of the right 
of their position (as looked at in sketch 1) which had not as strong 
natural breastworks as the left. 
The accompanying sketches will, however, show how the position of 
our batteries necessarily rendered ineffective much of our fire, and I 
think the greater portion of the enemy's loss must have come from the 
