SILVER MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY, 1898. 
295 
incidentally leads to one most important conclusion. It is this : that, in 
future organizations, the great hulk of the ammunition supply must take 
the form of free ammunition, not tied to particular batteries ; and only 
sufficient need be with each battery to keep it supplied for a moderate 
time. It is evident that if every battery had to carry with it an enor¬ 
mous train of wagons, containing sufficient ammunition for all probable 
requirements, there must be great waste of road space and mobility as 
probably only a few batteries would expend the full amount carried on 
any particular occasion. This consideration effectually disposes of the 
two gun and 12 wagon theory, and gives a most important and valuable 
principle to go upon, viz. :— 
That in organizing a Q.F. field armament no excessive amount of 
ammunition supply should be provided with the batteries, but that the 
extra ammunition, necessitated by the different type of gun, must be 
entirely carried by a highly-developed and well-organized system of 
ammunition columns, which has to be created. Very stringent regula¬ 
tions will also be required that other troops are to make way for the 
advance of ammunition columns. 
We are however at present no nearer to estimating the actual number 
of rounds required, than before. But when we find that in the great 
battles of 1870 it was quite exceptional for a battery to fire more 
than 1,000 rounds in any one battle, and that batteries which did this 
were those which had been brought earliest into the fight, and been 
most actively engaged ; as for instance Korber’s Horse Artillery Batteries 
at Yionville, which, commencing by surprising the French camps soon 
after 8.30 a.m. were engaged in a more or less continuous struggle till 
darkness put an end to further fighting—we see that in those days 1,000 
rounds per battery would have been an amply sufficient supply of 
ammunition for any one day, and the German rate of “ rapid fire ” was 
more rapid than our present rate. 
Several battles in quick succession, as happened round Metz in 1870, 
have however to be provided for. 
To estimate the expenditure of Q.F. guns it must be remembered 
that although the fire may be at times very rapid, yet the production of 
effect will be also very rapid. In fact, granted good fire discipline and 
good shooting, there seems no special reason why more projectiles 
should be required to attain a given result when the fire is rapid than 
when it is slow. Nay, the very fact of producing results rapidly, is of 
itself a factor of great power. It would almost appear possible that for 
any given object fewer rounds will be required to produce decisive 
results, than before. But the batteries will not permit themselves to 
remain idle, and therefore more rounds will certainly be used in the 
day’s work than with slow firing equipments. 
We turn to the infantry, to see what increase they have made in 
their supply of ammunition since they adopted Q.F. rifles—for the 
so-called “magazine” is simply a Q.F. rifle as compared with former 
patterns—but it is not at all easy to ascertain what has been the 
average increase in the number of cartridges carried per rifle, since 
this was adopted by all the great powers. So far as can be made out 
the total number of rounds per rifle taken into the field appears to 
have been about doubled. The writer is not aware how far this 
increase has been based on detailed estimates, or whether it has been 
merely a rough increase. It is probably, for infantry, an abundant 
estimate, as, although, in individual cases of regiments hotly engaged, 
