COMMENDED ESSAY, 1898. 
327 
1. Increased rapidity of fire.—The very name, “ Quick Firer,” points T i ncrea sed 
to this as being the chief advantage to be gained, and any others that rapidity of fire, 
there may be are more or less incidental to this main object, and due 
to details of design and manufacture rendered necessary in order to 
obtain this result. 
Rapidity of fire, combined with accuracy, is rightly looked upon as 
the test of a well-trained battery, not on the principle of 20 years ago, 
that the smartest battery was the one that could “ get the first round 
off ” after coming into action, but because it is felt that a battery which 
can fire rapidly and accurately must be so thoroughly imbued with a 
spirit of fire discipline that no excitement or unforeseen circumstances 
could disorganize the system. If then, by some mechanical means, the 
rate of fire can be still further increased without unduly straining the 
detachments, it would appear that there must be a distinct advantage, 
provided always that accuracy is not sacrificed to a desire to “ break the 
record ” in the matter of rapidity, and that the fire tactics are such that 
the rate of fire is always suited to the particular circumstances of the 
moment. 
As in most military questions, there are two distinct heads under 
which the advantages to be gained by the increased rapidity of fire may 
be considered, they are :— 
(a) The moral effect. 
(b) The physical effect. 
(a) The moral effect.—Napoleon laid down that in war the moral 
was to the physical as three to one, and it is certainly from this moral 
effect that one must look for much of the advantage to be gained by the 
power of being able, at a moment’s notice, to direct a hail of shell upon 
a particular object. 
The moral effect of such a fire, when once the range has been even 
approximately found, should be so great as to shatter the adversaries’ 
nerves, and make it impossible for them, if Artillery, to obtain the 
range or carry on anything like a steady fire. Against attacking 
Infantry the effect should be to make it impossible for them to pass 
across the fire-swept ground until the guns have been silenced ; and 
against those on the defensive the necessity of remaining under cover 
should prevent them making any adequate attempt to meet an advanc¬ 
ing enemy. 
This all points to the enormous advantage to be gained by being in 
action before the hostile Artillery, and should materially assist the 
batteries of the defence, whose duty it is to ascertain beforehand the 
ranges of all conspicuous points in the enemy’s line of advance and 
crush his batteries in detail as they attempt to come into action. 
It may be said, then, that the moral effect of this increased rate of 
fire will be to protect, to a greater extent than at present, the guns 
which first obtain the range, by causing the adversary’s fire to be 
inaccurate and irregular. 
(b) The physical effect.—The drill book lays down that the defeat 
of the enemy, and not protection from his fire, must be the primary 
object of Artillery in action, and that this can best be obtained :— 
(1) When engaged with Artillery, by concentrating an overwhelming 
fire on successive portions of the line of guns. 
(2) When supporting an Infantry attack, by concentrating the fire 
of all (or a large portion of) the guns on the part of the enemy’s line 
which has been indicated as the point of attack, and 
