328 COMMENDED ESSAY, 1898. 
(3.) When attacked by Infantry, by distributing fire over the whole 
front of the attackers, or over every part of the enemy’s attack 
formation. 
In each of these cases, assuming the laying equally good, a battery 
which, after finding the range, can fire 30 aimed rounds per minute (a 
rate which is below that claimed for some quick firers) and keep up 
that fire whilst the emergency exists, must have an enormous advantage 
over a battery which, magazine and salvo fire excepted, can only main¬ 
tain a rate of some 7 rounds a minute ; and the physical effect, or 
amount of material damage caused, must be approximately proportional 
to the number of extra rounds fired in the given time. 
This advantage is further accentuated by the fact that on the battle 
field, opportunities are often fleeting, and whilst they last the field gun 
may be able to fire so few rounds that the percentage of hits, even with 
good shooting, can do little, whereas the extra number of rounds from 
the quick firer may cause an enormous amount of damage ; for instance, 
when firing at Artillery coming into action, or moving along a road 
past a gap of which the range has been ascertained beforehand ; or when 
Horse Artillery is acting with Cavalry against Cavalry, during the few 
moments immediately preceding the charge. But, in addition to these 
ordinary phases of the battle, there are many occasions in war when 
the extra power of rapid fire might be of the greatest advantage ; for 
instance, in the defence of a bridge or other defile, where it is 
frequently only possible to put two guns in action on the road. With 
quick firers this section would have as great a stopping effect as a whole 
battery of field guns, and it would seem impossible that a defile so 
protected could be rushed. 
Again, with advance and rear guards, where the object is to use 
as few troops as possible, the quick firer will be a distinct acquisition, 
not because it would, when so employed, always have to fire rapidly, 
but because it would be able to do so if required. 
Advance guards at times have opportunities of surprising the enemy, 
as at Beaumont and Mars La Tour in 1870, and the moral effect of such 
a surprise would be greatly enhanced by rapid and accurate fire from 
the Artillery. 
With rear guards the difficulty is that one must employ sufficient 
troops to force the enemy to deploy to turn them out of each position 
taken up, but, the more troops employed the harder it is to withdraw 
them ; and as the fire of a battery of quick firers could, on an emergency 
be as heavy as that of a brigade division of field guns, added to which 
it would occupy less ground and could be more easily withdrawn, it 
would appear that such a battery would in this case greatly simplify 
matters. 
Again, when closely supporting an Infantry assault, which is always 
liable to be suddenly checked and thrown into confusion by a skilful 
counter attack, the rapid fire of quick firers would be most valuable to 
break up such attack, and also to prevent a recurrence of it after the 
position has been captured. In the latter case it would probably be 
only stray batteries of the attack which could at first come into action 
and the increased power of their fire would materially assist the 
Infantry in holding their ground, and make it very difficult for the 
enemy to attempt any counter attack in force. 
And lastly, it has for many years been the boast of gunners that 
Artillery can defend its own front, and this it has seldom failed to do 
