COMMENDED ESSAY, 1898. 
329 
in recent years, if we except Balaclava, the German Cavalry charge near 
Flavighy, and our own Cavalry charge at Kassassin ; but, if there is any 
doubt about this, it should no longer exist with quick-firing Field 
Artillery, when we consider that such a battery could pour over 100 
shell into Cavalry during the last 500 yards of the charge, and this 
without any change of drill or confusion due to guns running back 
upon the limbers. 
The above remarks are based on the following data, viz., that quick 
firers can fire at least five aimed or 15 unaimed shots per minute (these 
numbers being well within the estimates of inventors), and that there 
is no lack of ammunition, the difficulties as to the supply of this being 
considered later. Also that “ Battery fire at 10 seconds ” is a fair 
estimate of the rate of fire of the present field guns under ordinary 
circumstances, and that magazine fire with these guns is only intended 
to be used for “ meeting a Cavalry attack at close range.” 
2. Absence of recoil.—The advantages to be derived from a total 2 . Absence of 
absence of recoil may best be considered under the four heads :— rec011 ' 
(a) Saving of time. 
(b) Saving of labour. 
(c) Less level ground necessary. 
(d) The possibility of using unaimed fire. 
(a) Saving of time.—That time is lost owing to having to run up 
guns in action, time which would not be taken up by any of the neces¬ 
sary operations of supplying ammunition and loading, is amply proved 
by the paragraph in the drill book relating to magazine fire, which says 
that “ as rapidity is of supreme importance . . . the guns are not run 
up unless it is necessary to do so.” 
(b) Saving of labour.—Nothing is so tiring for the detachments as 
the continual running up of the guns. Even on hard ground it is 
irksome, but on sand or soft ground it soon becomes fatiguing, and 
materially lessens the fighting power of the men, and affects what 
Captain Herbert, in his “ Psychology of the Battle Field,” calls the 
vitality or power of the body to resist the forces of destruction. 
An example of this on service may be found in the action at Mahuta, 
in 1882, when Hickman’s Division of N/A was in action from about 
7.30 a.m. to 6 p.m. ; the ground was fairly firm sand, but the labour of 
“ running up ” was so great that the drivers had to assist in reliefs. 
Again, at Waterloo it is related that the gunners were so tired out 
towards the end of the battle that it was impossible to run the guns up, 
and finally guns and limbers all got mixed up together. 
(c) Less level ground necessary.—This may be a matter of consider¬ 
able importance in selecting positions for guns, as frequently with field 
guns it is impossible to occupy ground which presents great advantages 
both of view and cover because of a slope in rear down which the guns 
would recoil. In the same way the inability to occupy the line imme¬ 
diately above the reverse slope of a hill frequently necessitates occupying 
a more forward position, thereby exposing the guns more to view with 
no compensating advantages. 
(d) The possibility of using unaimed fire.—With a gun that recoils, 
unaimed fire must be out of the question ; the gun frequently recoils 
in a slightly oblique direction, due to some irregularity of the ground, 
and, as it would only be on the greatest emergency, when no attempt 
could be made to run up, that there would be any real necessity to use 
such fire, not only would it be useless, it would be positively dangerous 
