COMMENDED ESSAY. 1898. 
349 
to that flank to give him time to make the necessary dispositions, 
rapidity of fire must be to the advantage of the Artillery, since success¬ 
ful defence depends in this case entirely on the number of shell which 
can be fired in a very short time. (It need scarcely be pointed out that 
since sufficient time is all important to the defence, the open ground 
which the Cavalry have to traverse before coming to close quarters must 
be of considerable extent.) 
This is a very real advantage, for with the much bolder role assigned 
to the Artillery of to-day, it will often find itself in positions where it 
must look after its own flanks. This may especially happen when the 
batteries of divisional Artillery first join that of the Advanced Guard, 
especially if the position be at all to one flank of the advance. The 
small force of Infantry of the Advanced Guard may very well be 
occupied in clearing the ground to the front of the enemy’s advanced 
troops leaving its Artillery considerably in rear, with but a small escort, 
probably of Cavalry only (possibly with none), the troops of the main 
body being also too far in rear to afford support. This state of affairs 
offers a promising opportunity for an enterprising Cavalry.* 
Artillery y. Infantry.— Taking the case of the attack first, I do 
not believe that Artillery now, any more than formerly, will be able 
alone to prevail in a direct attack on well posted, well disciplined and 
unbroken Infantry.! Undoubtedly a more rapid fire, if effective, 
besides having an important moral effect, will tend to inflict heavier 
losses in a given time ; but it must be remembered that a firing line of 
Infantry presents but a small, if a wide target, especially if advan¬ 
tageously posted ; and fire which not only looks, but is, extremely 
accurate, may often be ineffective. It will be in the support of the 
final stages of the Infantry attack that accurate rapid fire will have its 
most tremendous effects. It should (always supposing that the Artillery 
of the defence has been sufficiently crippled in the previous Artillery 
duel, and cannot therefore force a second Artillery duel), render 
the advance of the reserves to support the firing line, a task of extreme 
difficulty ; and, if the assault be successful, the presence of Artillery in 
close support of the Infantry, exhausted by its efforts, will be more 
than ever desirable to hold the position against counter-attack, which to 
be rapid must be, it is agreed, made by troops in fairly close formation. 
Except in these respects I cannot see that the rapid fire of the Q.F. gun 
will have an effect likely to upset our notions of the attack as accepted 
at present. I cannot but think that those who build theories on 
the effect of a rapid fire on difficult targets will be wofully disappointed ; 
and a careful watch lest ammunition be so wasted will be one of the most 
anxious duties of commanders. It will be on easy targets that rapid fire 
will naturally have its especially decisive effects. I therefore dismiss 
without comment the arguments of those who state that the Q.F. guns 
will give Field Artillery such power that in the battles of the future it 
will practically go in and capture positions, which the Infantry will 
subsequently occupy at their leisure, and with little or no loss. J 
* Yon Schell “ Tactics of Field Artillery ” (Official Translation), page 16. 
f “Letters on Artillery,” page 161, Von Dresky states his opinion, “I have found 
that it is impossible with Artillery fire alone to drive out good Infantry from a position.'’ 
Although in 1870-1 only common shell were used, I believe the statement holds to-day. 
X Home, in “ Precis of Modern Tactics,” 1882, page 57, describes such a proceeding as 
follows. “ Such tactics are those that a leader having a raw undisciplined army 
composed of various nations, would adopt, trusting to the accuracy of fire of his 
Artillery. (Comments on the battle of Wagram.) 
34 
