350 
COMMENDED ESSAY, 1898. 
Taking next the case of defence. Ii is now accepted as an axiom that 
Artillery can easily guard its own front against Infantry, provided the 
attack be made over ground over which Artillery fire can be properly 
developed. It was proved to be the case in the war of 1870-1, and is 
even more certain to-day since shrapnel shell fire has increased the 
deadliness of Artillery fire, even were its rapidity not increased, while 
the range of the rifle has not been materially extended. On the other 
hand it would be just as insane to-day as it ever has been since the 
introduction of the rifle, to allow Infantry to approach close under 
cover, whether in front or on a flank, trusting to destroy it (the Infantry) 
in its advance over a few hundred yards of open ground. I am very 
sure that Infantry would never attempt to so advance until it had 
destroyed the gunners (which it should easily do with cover at any 
range below about 800 yards), after which it could advance and take the 
guns at its leisure.* There is no analogy between the defence against 
Cavalry and Infantry in this respect. 
The danger of cover close at hand, especially should the Artillery be 
occupied by hostile Artillery, is exemplified by the events of the battle 
of Konig-gratz, in 1866, when 68 Austrian guns were captured by the 
Prussian Infantry which had crept up in standing corn to point blank 
range. Certainly the Austrian guns were enveloped in the smoke of 
their own furious cannonade, which will not occur now, but on the 
other hand Infantry attack will now be much more difficult to locate 
for the same cause, even though it fire as it advances. 
Artillery in Pursuit. —Here the power of rapid fire will be of 
the utmost advantage. The targets, disorganized troops painfully 
attempting to reform, or columns choking the exits from the field of 
battle, are just those easy targets on which, as previously stated, rapid 
fire can have its maximum effect, and the Q.F. gun will therefore 
enormously increase the power of Artillery “ to turn a defeat into a 
rout.” t 
Artillery in a Rear Guard. —The power of rapid fire cannot 
here materially alter existing conditions except perhaps in warding off 
Cavalry attacks. In any case the duties of Artillery in retreat are not 
so much to inflict heavy loss as to delay the pursuer ; but, were it other¬ 
wise, it could not frequently employ rapid fire for the reason that its 
only source of supply is from its limbers. It is impossible for it to 
keep its wagons close without running the risk of losing them, or being 
hampered by them if it has to take their safety into consideration. 
Artillery v. Artillery. —In a war between civilized powers we 
may, I think, take it for granted that the Artilleries of both combatants 
will be armed with guns differing little in power or rapidity of fire, 
since the immense importance of Artillery is now fully appreciated ; 
indeed, as I have already pointed out, the pendulum of opinion has 
swung almost too far in the direction of confidence in its powers. The 
only advantage therefore which can be obtained in future will be, as 
now, in the better employment of the powers of fire by one side or the 
other. The side which makes mistakes should pay so dearly for them 
that the importance of skill in handling guns tactically, and a “ fire 
* Such cover would give a great opportunity to machine guns, 
f “ Field Artillery Drill,” 1896, page 32. 
