352 
COMMENDED ESSAY, 1898. 
greater ease of ranging when laying directly will compensate for heavy 
losses. An adequate discussion of this most important question would 
demand an essay to itself, and cannot be entered on here, but the 
introduction of the Q.F. Gun will compel a definite decision sooner or 
later. 
Chance Encounter. —In the chance encounter between two forces, 
the attacking Artillery, as now, will have the advantage of the initiative, 
but in other respects, assuming no great disparity in numbers, or 
exceptional advantages favouring one side more than the other, the 
issue will depend on skill only. 
Horse Artillery acting with Cavalry. —If there is anything 
certain as to the action of Horse Artillery in this case (and there is not 
much), it is that its opportunities will be fleeting and its fire rapid, and 
therefore the power of pouring in a rapid fire must be of the utmost 
advantage to it. Again when in pursuit or forming a rallying point for 
its own Cavalry if defeated, its target will be Cavalry moving fast and 
consequently its fire must be as rapid as possible. 
The Q.F. System will therefore, as far as can be seen, add immensely 
to the importance of Horse Artillery when acting with Cavalry. 
War with AN uncivilized foe. —The power of rapidity of fire in 
this case can but be an unmitigated advantage. 
It is scarcely necessary to point out that the chief danger in these wars 
is the rush of a mass of men, frequently fanatics, brimful of courage, 
and needing an amount of killing which is amazing. In such cases as 
these, tactics are at a complete discount, fire is everything, and the 
result depends merely on whether a sufficient number of the enemy 
can be slaughtered before they break in the opposing lines by sheer 
weight. Had our guns at Maiwand been quick-firing and sufficiently 
supplied with ammunition the result would have been very different. 
It is well known that a few more shell and a bold forward movement 
by our Infantry, wer6 all that were needed at one period of the action 
to have turned the tide to success instead of failure.* 
Of course when attacking such a foe good tactics are of avail, and the 
value of rapid fire will also occasionally be experienced, but it is 
notorious that the most decisive battles are those in which the civilized 
army has to assume the defensive. The victory or defeat is usually 
rapid and crushing. 
The methods of war of uncivilized peoples do not lend themselves to 
successful defence which requires the tenacity of disciplined forces, and 
when they accept the defensive they are not often successful. Indeed 
if they do not assume the offensive it is comparatively rare for them to be 
brought to decisive battle at all, and a guerilla warfare results, peculiarly 
trying to civilized forces. 
The above remarks apply to semi-civilized peoples also, but to a less 
degree ; since civilization tends, by installing a knowledge of the hope¬ 
lessness of a contest against the better disciplined forces and larger 
resources of a civilized foe, to weaken the wonderful courage of 
ignorance. 
Conclusion. 
In conclusion I shall discuss a statement which I have seen, which 
is to the effect that the introduction of the Q.F. gun will, owing to its 
* “ Afghan War,” by Hensman, pages 554-5, 
