354 
COMMENDED ESSAY, 1898. 
But the basis of the proposal is untenable. The fire power of an 
Artillery cannot be judged under all circumstances by its possible 
maximum rapidity. Immediately observation becomes difficult the Q.F. 
gun can do no more than the existing one (as I dismiss the possibility 
of a commander pouring in a rapid fire on the mere chance of its being 
effective), and its only advantage is that of a simpler and easier service 
(see page 348). Moreover a larger number of guns must always 
have the advantage over a smaller in concentration of fire, even though 
it be slower. A smaller number of guns on the other hand, however 
rapid their fire, must for a time leave a portion of the larger number at 
peace. It cannot cover the whole target at once, even allowing for the 
cone of dispersion of shrapnel. To trust to this latter is especially un¬ 
sound when Artillery is the target, since the personnel is not distributed 
evenly over the whole front, but in groups having some depth. # 
I maintain therefore that while a given number of Q.F. guns will, 
under favourable conditions, have a marked superiority over an equal 
number of existing field guns, that superiority cannot be by any means 
always expected. Just as the magazine rifle will have immense value 
for rapid fire at very short ranges—and no one dreams of using “ maga¬ 
zine fire ” at lcwag ones, if control can possibly prevent it—so the Q.F. 
field gun will have great advantages when targets and observations are 
easy. 
As such favourable opportunities will be exceptional and usually 
brief, it will only be when they are instantly seized and made the most 
of, that the full advantages of the Q.F. gun will be reaped. 
Its adoption therefore can only be claimed as an advantage by that 
Artillery which can use it with promptitude and skill. The indifferently 
trained Artillery on the other hand, to which it but offers increased 
power to waste ammunition, must regard it with dismay as a powerful 
engine in the hands of the adversary. 
Skilful tactics and perfect fire discipline will now more than ever be 
the determining factors of success on the field of battle. 
APPENDIX. 
The annual charges for batteries of Horse and Field Artillery on the 
higher establishment (including every form of expense, not merely pay) 
are £15,123 and £13,773 respectively. Consequently savings commen¬ 
surate with the reduction of two guns should be £4,990 and £4,545 in 
the two cases. The actual savings, owing to establishment for ammu¬ 
nition supply having to be retained, are :— 
* When firing at a moving target using a ranging section the want of power with a 
four-gun battery has been specially noticed. 
