366 
COMMENDED ESSAY, 1898. 
Loss of fire 
control. 
Special efforts 
demanded of 
every man in a 
Q.F. battery to 
obtain success. 
efforts on the part of all concerned. But it must be borne in mind that 
a considerable proportion of the personnel of a battery (however good 
the average excellence of that battery may be, and however good its 
training) cannot be considered to have high capabilities ; and though 
these men may not make much difference in the fire discipline of the 
battery at practice, through being kept more or less in the background, 
yet on service, when they will be required to replace casualties, the 
work will fall upon them ; and the higher the standard requisite the 
more will the fire discipline suffer. 
Of course it must be admitted that for the most part the fire discipline 
required of a battery armed with Q.F. guns would be the same as that 
expected of one using our present weapons. It is for the few brief 
moments when “ rapid fire ” is going on that higher qualities would be 
more particularly demanded of the former—perhaps only once or twice 
in the course of a fight, for two or three minutes at a time, if we ex¬ 
clude short series at moving targets—but then there is no doubt they 
would be required. To develope the full powers of the guns and to use 
them with success, the Battery Commander must be able to decide 
without hesitation when to use the full powers of the terrible weapon 
in his hand and, by careful observation of fire, when to stop ; the 
Section Commanders must be more than ever all eyes and ears ; the 
layers must be first-class men at their laying, the gunners at the service 
of their guns, those who prepare the fuzes at their fuze-setting, and 
those in charge of ammunition supply must be equally first-rate. All 
these high qualities of mind and body must be available under the 
stress of battle. 
It is easy to see that the personnel of a battery of Q.F. field guns 
would thus be very highly tried, and even the best that can be got 
might be found wanting. With “simple” field guns it is found, even 
on the practice ground, that it is not advisable to use “ section fire ” 
except at short ranges or at moving targets, as control of fire becomes 
lost—the fire gets “out of hand ” : but with Q.F. guns at “rapid fire” 
there would be really no control of fire properly speaking, except that 
the Battery Commander should be able to stop it at will. For it must 
be allowed that a regular fire from flank to flank, or by sections, could 
not be properly called “ rapid fire ” with Q.F. guns. For one gun to 
have to wait, even for the other gun of the section to fire, before firing 
the next round would mean that practically the guns could no longer 
be considered Q.F.: such a diminution in the rate of fire would entirely 
prevent the full development of the one great advantage in the use of 
Q.F. guns, and would bring the disadvantages already enumerated into 
a prominence which the weapons do not deserve. Each gun must, 
then, during “ rapid fire ” become a fire unit for the time, with the 
layer as its chief. This loss of fire control, inevitable if the fire is to be 
really a rapid fire, must be considered a disadvantage, but one that can 
be got over to some extent by special training. 
It will, I think, be evident from a consideration of the above disad¬ 
vantages that, taken together, they imply this :—If a Q.F. equipment 
is to be used in the field with success very special efforts will be 
required of the personnel right through the batteries; increased efforts, 
mental and physical, will be demanded of everyone both on the line of 
march and in action. If we have to specify any particular men as 
more especially called upon to exert their utmost powers we must, I 
think, say that they will be those responsible for the supply and pre- 
