528 
BOMBARDMENT OF SEBASTOPOL. 
was 11 officers and 316 men, whereas on the 15th, when these batteries 
were not manned, the strength of the reliefs falls to seven officers 
and 245 men 1 , the difference being exactly the number of the four 
officers and 70 men required for the eleven 32-prs. (at six men per 
gun) in the two advanced batteries. 
At page 160, it is stated that two fresh gun detachments went down 
to No. 7 battery during the five hours it was in action on the 13th. 
This is improbable, for there were no spare men in the trenches, the 
Royal Artillery being far too short handed to have present other men 
than those actually working the guns in the different batteries. 2 To 
have provided fresh detachments, men must have been brought from 
camp, which would have taken at least three hours ; they would have 
come with a proportion of officers, and such an arrangement would 
have been practically a relief, of which we have no official record. 
At page 159, it is stated that the Russian heavy guns were firing 
almost point blank at our advanced battery. Now the point blank 
range of a 68-pr., the heaviest gun in the Russian works, varies 
from 300 to 400 yards in proportion to its weight of 87, 95 or 112 
cwt. The shortest distance between the opposing works was upwards 
of 750 yards; the Russians must therefore have been firing with over 
1° of elevation. 
At page 164, it is stated that the four guns in No. 7 battery were 
disabled on the morning of the 13th of April, but the artillery and 
engineer official returns agree in shewing that but one gun was dis¬ 
abled and that by the fracture of a wheel of the carriage. The other 
guns were probably temporarily out of action through the disruption 
of the embrasures. 
At page 166, the casualties in the advanced battery, No. 7, on the 
13th are set down at 44 killed and wounded, but the official return clear¬ 
ly shews that the casualties in the whole left attack on that day were 
three killed and seven wounded, and during the ten days bombard¬ 
ment only amounted to 13 killed and 25 wounded. 
In conclusion it may be observed that though Mr. Kinglake has 
been desirous of chronicling a remarkable deed of arms, yet through 
faulty information and misconception, he has presented an inaccurate 
account of what actually took place, and has failed to realize that of 
the two days fighting, that on the 14th was most prolonged and severe. 
ITis narrative, however, agrees in the main with official and other 
document so far as they record that on the days in question all 
performed their duty well, that the guns were gallantly and persistently 
served, and that the contest reflects credit on those engaged, and on 
the Royal Artillery. 
1 Morning states of left attack. 
2 Tlie paucity of gunners was severely felt at this period of the siege, so much so that a 
detachment from “ J ” Field Battery which arrived in Balaclava harbour on April 8th, were 
at once marched under Lieutenant C. Lennox Tredcroft to the right siege train camp and served 
through the bombardment, 
