THE EOYAL AETILLEEY INSTITUTION. 
301 
weight, or with “ a grenado,” which was about the same diameter as the 
stone shot and 2"thick.* * * § On the 16th April “they cast a grenado which 
fell into the old court, striking about half a yard into the earth; yet it rose 
with such violence again in bursting, that though its strength was much 
deadened and lessened by the earth, yet it shook down the glass, clay, and 
weaker buildings near it, leaving only the carcass of the walls standing 
about it.”f 
The leather guns which the Scots, according to Bishop Burnet, carried 
on horses, were differently moved by the English, and at Copredy 
Bridge, the same year, the cavaliers took “two baricadoes of wood, 
which were drawn upon wheels, and in each seven small brass and leather 
cannon, charged with case.”f At this battle was taken prisoner, serving 
in the Parliamentary army, Weemes, the Master Gunner of England. His 
salary was £300 a year, equivalent to about £1000 a year at the present 
time; and his duty was “ to show the best of his Skill to all that are 
employed in Gunnery in their Majesties service . . . and at each ones 
admission to administer an Oath which binds him not to serve any foreign 
prince or state without leave, and not to teach any Man the Art of Gunnery 
but what has taken the said Oath.”§ Eldred says that the pay of a gunner 
in his time varied from 6d. to 8d. a day, or about Is. 9d. in our money. 
The Boyalists had some 25 guns at Marston Moor. The pieces posted 
on their right flank were carefully ensconced behind a bank, but by some 
oversight their outer flank was entirely unprotected. Cromwell at once 
perceived the weak point, swept round the bank, avoiding the fire, and 
having captured the guns turned them against their own infantry. This 
completed the defeat of the Cavalier right. The accounts of this battle 
that are extant are of such a nature as to preclude any trustworthy account 
of the battle in general, or of what befel the guns of the Boyalist left wing. 
The crushing defeat at Naseby, 1645, which virtually ended the war, 
was undoubtedly in a great measure owing to the ungovernable rashness 
and precipitation of Prince Bupert; and lie failed to display here, as he 
invariably failed to display, any of the qualities of a great cavalry leader 
except personal courage. He might have commanded a squadron with 
distinction, but he was utterly incapable of leading a brigade. At Naseby 
he forced the Cavaliers prematurely into action, “ before the cannon was 
turned or the ground made choice of upon which they were to fight; so 
that courage was only to be relied on where all conduct failed so much.”|| 
He charged with his wonted headlong courage, and as usual he succeeded 
in worsting the cavalry opposed to him at the first onset ; but as usual he 
was either unwilling or unable to rally his troopers after the charge and 
complete the rout of the enemy’s cavalry, or rejoin the main body of the 
Cavaliers, where his presence would have averted an irreparable catastrophe, 
though it might not have sufficed to prevent a defeat. But while Cromwell 
* Halsall’s “ Journal of tlie Siege of Lathom House,” 15th April, 
f Ibid. 
J Clarendon, p. 522. 
§ Chamberlayne’s “State of England,” Pt. 2, p. 197 of Vol. for year 1691. 
11 Clarendon, p. 590. 
