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MINUTES OF PEOCEEDINGS OF 
in Afghanistan, and by Bamian over the passes of the Hindoo Koosh to 
Cabnl. A battery of Bengal Horse Artillery succeeded in crossing the 
range by this road when in pursuit of Dost Mahomed northwards in 1840, but 
the difficulties are almost insurmountable. There is, however, another and a 
far more feasible route for a Russian advance towards India than any of those 
I have yet alluded to—namely by the Caspian to Ashourada, Astrabad, and 
so on, via Meshed, to Herat and Candahar. The distances doubtless are 
considerable (forty marches from Astrabad to Herat), the difficulties are 
great, and the country has been partially devastated by marauding tribes; 
nevertheless, as it is fertile and populous, it is in every respect a far more 
easy road than the others, besides which an advance in that direction would 
turn the flank of the Hindoo Koosh. A railway is said to be projected 
from Astrabad to Herat. Herat standing on this road, on the borders of 
Afghanistan, occupies a position of great strategical importance, and has 
been a constant source of strife between the Persians and the Afghans. 
There are indeed many English officers, who looking upon the Hindoo Koosh 
as the line of our natural frontier, advocate the immediate advance of a 
British force and the occupation of Herat. 
I have now endeavoured to give you a sketch of the gradual progress and 
of the present position of Russia in Central Asia; I am aware that it is but 
a sketch, but time will admit of no more. You will have observed that her 
policy is a steadfast, unchanging one, and is pursued year by year, in spite 
of difficulties and occasional delays. She has crossed great deserts, and by 
means of inland seas and great rivers has succeeded in establishing her 
communications, and in penetrating to the heart of the three great princi¬ 
palities, and to their most fruitful provinces. She is now busily engaged 
in strengthening her position, developing her commerce, and preparing for 
fresh enterprises. 
It is also evident that no great military power exists which is able to 
check her progress. Bokhara, Khiva, and Kokan have not even been able 
to take advantage of the natural difficulties of' the country to offer more 
than a momentary opposition. Chinese Turkestan is also in too unsettled 
a state to hold out against a powerful attack. Persia, though more for¬ 
midable, is perhaps more likely to prove an ally than a vigorous enemy. 
Afghanistan, with its rugged mountains, its brave and warlike people, alone 
remains to stem the tide of advance. 
There are many, both in England and in India, who regard the southward 
march of Russia with considerable alarm, as affecting our position in the 
East. This indeed is no new feeling. Our advance to Cabul thirty years 
ago was in a measure caused by an exaggerated fear of Russia even in those 
days, and I have shown you how great her progress has been since that 
time. There are others again who take quite the opposite view, and who 
maintain that the conquest of Central Asia by Russia will contribute to the 
general welfare of the people concerned, and that danger to India is almost 
impossible, owing to the distances still remaining to be traversed, and to the 
difficulties which under such circumstances must arise in the movements of 
large bodies towards our frontiers. In short they look upon any collision 
between ourselves and Russia in the East as almost a delusion. 
I am not of those who regard the question from an alarmist point of 
view, and I can well understand that the absorption of those miserable 
