THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION. 
399 
principalities by a great Christian civilized power, may be a material blessing 
to the people; but looking at the vast progress Russia has made, especially 
of late years, and anticipating that ere long her outposts will assuredly 
arrive at the northern slopes of the Hindoo Koosh, it does appear to me a 
matter of considerable importance to us, that our Indian Empire should thus 
be brought into comparative proximity with another great military power, 
instead of as hitherto, our being surrounded by troublesome but weak 
Asiatic tribes. 
It may not be a matter for alarm, but it can hardly be one for indif¬ 
ference. 
As regards the supposed impossibility of Russia's further advance, owing 
to distances and natural obstacles, no doubt there is much to be said; but 
judging by our own experience, and looking back at our own work during 
the last century, it does not appear that any such considerations have 
checked our progress, which has been attended with, far more difficulties 
than any Russia is now likely to encounter. 
As Sir John Malcolm said, in his “ Political History of India—- 
“The great empire which England has established in the East will be the 
theme of wonder to succeeding ages. That a small island in the Atlantic should 
have conquered and held the vast continent of India as a subject province, is in 
itself a fact which can never be stated without exciting astonishment. But the 
surprise will be increased when it is added that this great conquest was made, not 
by the collective force of the nation, but by a company of merchants who, originally 
vested with a charter of exclusive commerce * * * actually found themselves 
called upon to act in the character of sovereigns over extended kingdoms, before 
they had ceased to be the mercantile directors of petty factories.” 
I have quoted this passage from the writings of a celebrated man to 
remind you of the great work we have accomplished in the East. 
We have not only sailed for thousands of miles over distant seas, but 
beginning with small factories on the coast, have marched 1600 miles from 
Calcutta to Peshawur, and overturning kingdom after kingdom—many of 
them of considerable military power—we have at length reached the confines 
of Central Asia. It is surely not for us then to speak of impossibilities. 
Considering it then as a moral certainty that Russia will ere many years 
reach the northern slopes of the Hindoo Koosh, the question naturally 
arises as to what our general line of policy should be ? 
In considering our north-west policy, three courses appear to be open to ’ 
us. 
The first is absolute neutrality, or what is called “ masterly inactivity." 
The second is to advance to the conquest of the greater portion of 
Afghanistan, and to take up the line of the Hindoo Koosh, with Herat as 
the extreme point on our left flank. 
The third is to conciliate, and if necessary to subsidize the Afghans; to 
establish if possible a strong government in that country, and thus to 
convert them into faithful allies, and induce them to hold their mountain 
ranges as a barrier against all comers. 
As regards the first—neutrality—were we in possession of the mountains 
which fringe our frontier, or were our neighbours a quiet, inoffensive. 
