THE EOYAL AETILLEEY INSTITUTION. 
435 
(which not being discerned, and doing some execution, struck a terror into 
them)/' he advanced, routed the enemy, and took five guns. 1 2 
The destructive effect of Turner's guns on the knoll at the Alma could not 
have been considerable, from the comparatively short time they were in action; 
yet so great was the terror their presence, on a commanding position, inspired 
in the Russian ranks, that these two 9-prs., by a short and rapid fire, 
“ enforced the withdrawal of the causeway batteries, laid open the entry of 
the pass, shattered the enemy's reserves, stopped the onward march of the 
Ouglitz battalions, and chained up the high-mettled. Yladimir, in the midst 
of its triumphant advance." 3 
Eacts such as these force upon us the conclusion that bad guns well placed 
are more effective than good guns badly placed. 
To avail themselves of the advantages of good positions, batteries must 
possess mobility—the capacity of moving, accompanied by their gunners 
and an adequate supply of ammunition, from point to point of a battle-field. 
It is surely unnecessary to insist upon this definition of mobility; for it 
must be evident, on a moment's consideration, that to move a body of field 
artillery to any purpose, it must be moved as a whole, totus teres atque rotundus 
—guns, gunners, and ammunition. To move it otherwise is to put asunder 
things which should ever remain joined together; to dislocate the parts of a 
complicated machine which can only act in combination. Infantry without 
their rifles, cavalry without their sabres, present a no more forlorn spectacle 
than gunners without their guns. And what are guns without their gunners ? 
—the bow without the archer, the compass without the magnet, the body 
without the soul. 
The limits of mobility are clear and definite. It is a fundamental axiom 
in field artillery tactics that guns are useless when limbered-up . Erom this 
axiom it follows : firstly, that the movements of a battery in action should be 
minimum in number' —because in order to manoeuvre, the guns must be 
limbered-up; and secondly, that the movements of a battery in action should 
be made at maximum speed —because the slower the pace, the longer the guns 
remain limbered-up. 
Efficacy of fire 4 and mobility, then, are the two grand attributes on whose 
development the efficiency of field artillery depends, and the relation between 
them is as intimate as that between the magnitude and direction of a force 
in mechanics. Eor we can no more estimate the capabilities of a battery of 
guns of given calibre, without knowing at what pace it can move into action 
with its gunners and ammunition complete, than we can calculate the effect 
of a statical force of given magnitude, if we happen to be ignorant of the 
1 Lord Clarendon’s “Hist, of the Great Eebellion,” p.366. The effect of two (or four) shots 
from minion drakes must have been paltry; and the secret of Sir Ealph’s success undoubtedly 
lay in the suddenness of his fire, and the excellent position of his guns. 
2 Kinglake’s “Hist, of the War in the Crimea,” Yol. II. p. 400. 
3 The fault which detracts so much from the value of Decker’s otherwise excellent work, 
“ L’Artillerie a cheval avec la Cavalerie,” is his constant neglect of this principle. The manner 
in which, in many cases, he handles his guns, would be more suitable to a squadron of cavalry than 
to a battery of artillery. 
4 The destruction inflicted upon an enemy is, of course, the measure of the efficacy of fire; and, 
for any given gun, in any given position, depends upon the precision with which the gun is laid, and 
the successful action of the ammunition. 
