ACHIEVEMENTS OF FIELD ARTILLERY. 
BY 
MAJOR E. S. MAY, R.A. 
(Continued from JSFo. 14, Vol. XIX, p. 732). 
PART VI. 
The Russo-Turkisii War, 1877-78. 
Those who have followed us thus far will expect that after the Renais¬ 
sance which we drew attention to during our last chapters, a further and 
more vigorous growth, culminating in even more splendid fruits than 
crowned the performances of artillery in 1870-71, would form the 
feature in the next campaign in Europe. Such anticipations might 
fairly have been indulged in, and an unchecked swelling of the tide of 
progress have been confidently awaited. It must be frankly confessed 
at once, however, that as regards artillery the experiences of the 
Russo-Turkish War are disappointing. To those, however, who care 
to examine in detail causes as well as effects, there is much to be learnt 
from that struggle as regards artillery which will explain what defici¬ 
encies were observable, and in showing where error lay will give hope 
and confidence to us for the future. Moreover, while it may be admitted 
that guns fell back for a time during the campaign as regards their 
relative importance to the other arms, we are still far from allowing 
'that their failure was so complete or so general as it has sometimes 
been hastily assumed that it was. 
In the next pages we shall have occasion to refer to more than one 
achievement of which the arm may justly boast, and that, too, in a cam¬ 
paign which is sometimes regarded as uniformly disastrous to it, and 
shall have to show that guns gained in importance rather than other¬ 
wise, even during experiences which on the whole were not favourable 
to their reputation. 
It is not possible to speak of Plevna as an artillery achievement in 
the sense, that is to say, of an artillery success. Nevertheless at the 
prolonged engagement, extending over the 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, and 
11th of September, the Russian artillery played a part which was 
intended to be, and was so in one sense, predominant, and the failure 
of the final assault was no more to be laid at the door of the artillery than 
at that of any of the other arms. The general conduct of the whole 
operations, save only those undertaken by Skobeleff, was faulty in the 
extreme, unity of direction was lacking, the enemy's position was 
insufficiently reconnoitred, and was not clearly understood, while the 
efforts, neither of infantry nor artillery, were concentrated on the points 
which should have been recognised as decisive. Furthermore,, the 
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