4 
ACHIEVEMENTS OP FIELD ARTILLERY. 
In the first place, it is to be noted that unity of command during the 
operations, a condition indispensable to military success, was lacking, 
and that this must almost certainly have been so, will be clear when it 
is mentioned that there were present on the scene, Prince Charles of 
Roumania, commanding the troops at Plevna ; General Zotoff, his 
mentor, who may be regarded as their real head; the Commander-in- 
Chief, his Chief of the Staff, and finally the Emperor himself, with 
the Minister of War and a large suite. Those who are acquainted 
with the feelings held towards the Czar by the Russian troops, and 
the relations which existed between the other members of such a 
hierarchy of authorities, will appreciate the difficulties which were 
thus imposed on anything like an independent direction by any one 
individual, however high his position in the service. 
The division of authority thus engendered affected the plan of battle, 
militated against concentrated efforts, caused decisive points to be 
overlooked, and in consequence an inevitable lack of cohesion super¬ 
vened, not only as regards the general scheme of attack, but also 
affecting the manner in which the batteries were employed. 
Finally the deficiencies of the Intelligence Staff caused a mistaken 
view of the strength and resources of the Turks to be taken. 
It was admitted, when the plan of the third attack on Plevna was 
discussed, that the previous assaults had been insufficiently prepared 
by artillery, and therefore it was decided that not only were the Russian 
guns to fire on this occasion for hours, but days were to be given up to 
an annihilating bombardment, at which the services of siege guns were 
to be utilised. 
The artillery were to gradually approach the works, and as they did 
so the infantry, which during the preliminary bombardment were simply 
to act as escorts to them, were to “draw near to the works under cover 
of the ground,” and then break from their concealment to rush forward 
to their final assault. As matters turned out, however, both infantry 
and guns remained almost uniformly up to the moment the attack was 
launched on the 11th in the very same positions which they took on 
the 7th of September, and no gradual approach, far less an unobserved 
one, to the works was attempted at all. Moreover, it is the opinion of 
Prince Kouropatkin that to attain success, not only should the final 
assault have been prepared by artillery fire, but by that of infantry 
also, and that the advance of the bodies of troops should have been 
supported in like manner, not only by the guns, but by a heavy 
musketry fire too. 
While the tactics adopted by the infantry were thus faulty, the 
manner in which the great preponderance of guns was wasted was no 
less unfortunate. 
In order to clearly define what the role of the artillery was to be in 
the coming battle, General Zotoff had assembled a meeting of the 
principal artillery officers with the army at Poradim on the 2nd of 
September. At the council so formed he expressed his decided opinion 
that a continuous bombardment of the works, which should be persisted 
in until they and their garrisons showed evident signs of loss and 
destruction, ought to be carried out previous to any infantry attack. 
