ACHIEVEMENTS OF FIELD ARTILLERY. 
5 
To this it was objected that field guns could do but little injury to 
earthworks, and that neither the supply of ammunition nor the pieces 
themselves were equal to so heavy a call upon them. A counter 
proposition was then made that the redoubts should be swept by so 
heavy a fire as would destroy their armament, render them no longer 
a secure retreat for the reserves, and that by pouring a heavy fire on 
the approaches to them the advance of reinforcements should be 
rendered difficult. . It was held by other members of this conncil that 
the destruction of the works should not be attempted, nor their con¬ 
tinuous bombardment persevered in, but that the approaches alone 
should be cannonaded. The diversities of opinion thus exhibited were 
never really harmonised, and in the end no very definite plan at all was 
agreed' upon, while the event proved that none of the anticipations put 
forward had any solid foundation. 
As regards the ranges at which the guns were fought, the discussion 
thus set on foot proved for all practical purposes equally futile. It was 
admitted that one cause at least of previous failures had lain in the 
excessive distances at which batteries were kept from their objective, 
and it was said that the fault would not be repeated, yet the good 
resolutions agreed upon were forgotten on the field of battle, both by 
General and artillery leaders, and the batteries were held aloof as 
heretofore. 
For a pernicious belief in the superiority of the Turkish guns had 
seized possession of men's minds, and, moreover, it had become an 
article of faith amongst Russian gunners that their arm could not face 
infantry fire. For fear, therefore, that the Turkish musketry might 
injure them, when the infantry went forward they declined to move 
from their secure and remote positions, and even when on the defensive, 
after the loss of a few men, batteries were seen to limber up and retire, 
leaving their infantry in the lurch at the very moment they most 
needed support and assistance. 
Finally, a vital defect in the Russian direction of artillery fire is to 
be found in the ambiguity that was allowed to exist, even up to the 
most decisive moments, as to the objectives which were to be selected 
by the different batteries. It was supposed that the large bursting 
charges of the shells of the siege guns would indicate sufficiently to the 
others the direction in which they were to fire, and that, therefore, it 
was necessary for the higher leaders alone to superintend the fire of 
these. It has, however, long ago been recognised that concentration 
of fire is only to be obtained through concentration of guns thus brought 
under the personal guidance, by word of mouth if possible, of superior 
commanders. In the smoke and excitement of action it was utterly 
futile to hope that the bursting of shells, even of large size, could ade¬ 
quately replace such direction, and, moreover, a large percentage of 
the Russian shells never burst at all. 
Since here we are rather apologising for a failure than recording a 
success, it is not proper to enter minutely into the manner in which the 
various batteries were placed, and we must, therefore, simply state the 
fact that unity of purpose was lacking in a marked degree in the fire 
direction of the Russian guns. On the 7th, 8th, and 9th of September 
