6 
ACHIEVEMENTS OP FIELD ARTILLERY. 
those who directed the Russian operations in general had themselves no 
clear views as to the solution of the tactical problem before them, and the 
blame must lie on their shoulders therefore, but on the 10th the points 
of attack had been decided on and announced, and therefore those in 
command of the artillery must from that time be held responsible for 
the fault. And even after the points of assault had been selected, 
batteries wasted their fire on works that were never attacked, and were 
never intended to be attacked. Others, in place of moving forward 
to the support of their comrades, watched them callously being 
mowed down from their comfortable positions in rear, and, if an 
individual battery leader forgot himself for a moment and moved 
forward, he was ordered back as soon as a man or two fell. Thus, 
for four long days the batteries remained in the very same places 
where they came into action on the first, and, finally, to make the in¬ 
eptitude complete, almost all the 4-pr. guns, of which there were 180 
on the field, were held in reserve, and never fired a shot at all. And 
these facts are stated, be it remembered, not on the authority of any 
detractor of Russian methods, but on that of Prince Kouropatkin, who 
was Skobeleff’s Chief of the Staff during the war. 
The examples of enterprise set in 1870 were already unheeded seven 
years later, and a marked superiority in guns which had been utilised 
so notably by the Germans was an encumbrance rather than other¬ 
wise to those who did not understand how to turn artillery to account. 
What we have hitherto said has had reference rather to general 
tactics and the direction of the larger units of artillery than to the per¬ 
formances of the arm as regards shooting. At a time, however, when 
practice is attracting an unusual share of our attention, and the fire 
effect of batteries is jealously scrutinised, we may be pardoned if we 
pause to say a word on this part of the subject, and dwell a moment 
to let our readers hear the views put forward by Kouropatkin. 
But first of all we will recall to our reader’s recollection what we said 
in our first chapter as to moral effect, when we showed- that, even if we 
gunners claim to produce more tangible results, we need feel no reproaph 
when we are credited with such effect alone. Moral effect is indeed 
the chief factor in war, and is as worthy an object as a physical one. 
The two are inter-dependant, and projectiles are discharged, not alone 
to kill men or destroy material objects, but to make the idea gain 
possession of your enemy’s mind that it is impossible for him to stay 
any longer where he is when you lay upon him. How a given number 
of guns can best be utilised depends largely upon the end in view, and 
circumstances in war vary so greatly that it is injudicious to lay down 
any hard and fast rules for their conduct. Great principles having a 
firm basis, both in theory and practice, there must and will ever be, 
but the circumstances of the moment must nevertheless be paramount, 
and the method varied according to the task in hand. 
Now, on special occasions material destruction may be satisfactorily 
accomplished by means of a systematic, intermittent, and comparatively 
slow fire (and in siege warfare such a method is often the only one 
which can be employed). But in field warfare, speaking generally, the 
destruction of obstacles, the infliction of loss, or the demoralisation of 
