8 
ACHIEVEMENTS OE FIELD ARTILLERY. 
come on tliern, and does not increase, too suddenly. 1 2 
From these considerations it may be accepted that the action of 
artillery which strives to bring about the greatest possible demoralisa¬ 
tion of troops must not only be overpowering as regards the number 
of guns, but must produce its effect rapidly. 
We are told that on the 7th of September, when fire was opened 
by the Russian batteries with a view of destroying the Turkish works 
at Plevna and demoralising their defences, the whole of the “West 
Division,” according to Kouropatkin, or “Right Wing,” according to 
Greene, of the Russian army looked forward with absolute reliance to 
the effect of the artillery fire. The infantry listened with delight and 
confidence to the ceaseless thunder and the crash of bursting shells. 
The gunners, proud of the important part allotted to them, threw them¬ 
selves into their work with unwonted energy. The general emulation, 
the vastness of the means employed, the masses of infantry standing 
ready to rush forward, were all circumstances which prompted the arm 
to efficiency, even at the cost of great self-sacrifice. 
“ Had we stormed on that day our batteries were ready at the first 
word of command to limber up and drive on nearer and nearer in to aid 
their infantry and.support them. On that day we looked up to the 
gunners with the highest respect.” The officers, we read, exposed 
themselves recklessly in their eagerness to observe their fire, the 
splendid detachments, kindled by the example of their officers, were 
ready to die round the guns of which they were so proud. 
When day broke on the 8th it was clear that during the quiet of the 
previous night the Turks had repaired the ravages of the day before, 
and a leaden weight of disappointment sank on the hearts of the 
gunners. 
But they buckled quickly to their work again. 
The assault was confidently expected that day, but it passed as had 
done the previous one. Then the 9th went by, and then the 10th. 
Soon disappointment developed into disgust, and disgust led to 
reproaches. Every day showed more clearly that the guns were really 
effecting nothing, and finally the guns and ammunition began to be 
abused by the officers. It was no wonder that the men grew by 
degrees apathetic, and the belief gained ground that the assault would 
end in disaster. 
And, indeed, the effect of the Russian artillery on the 9th and 10th 
was even less than on the 7th and 8th, the fire so far from increasing 
in violence, in the way it should have done* as the crisis approached, 
grew slacker 3 as the hours slipped by, until, at the end of the fourth 
day, many guns 3 had become disabled, the supply of ammunition began 
to run short, and, to crown the disaster, the weather became most 
unfavourable, and thick fog obstructed the view. It was then evident 
1 Sevastopol is a case in point, where the losses were so great that the detachments of some of the 
Hussian guns had to he entirely renewed more than once in the course of the day. 
2 Prince Kouropatkin has closely examined the expenditure of ammunition, and has stated that 
it may be accepted as approximately true that up to the assault 30,000 projectiles were fired, 
and that each gun in position fired on an average 60 rounds on the 7th, 40 on the 8th, and 30 on 
the 9th and 10th. 
3 More than 60, according to Greene. 
