ACHIEVEMENTS OF FIELD ARTILLERY. 
9 
that the programme for the assault could never be carried out in its 
entirety, and it was decided to deliver it on the 11th. 
It is for their conduct during the actual assault of their comrades 
that the Russian batteries have been most severely criticised, and 
Kouropatkin especially instances the case of the 4th, 5th, and 6th 
batteries of the 16th Brigade, which accompanied Skobeleff’s attack 
on the green hills on the 8th, and which, when they began to feel the 
effect of the Turkish fire, limbered up and left their gallant brethren 
of the infantry in the lurch when their need was the sorest. According 
to the journal of the commander of the 5th Battery (which was the 
first to go) a the enemy's fire became so hot that the battery was com¬ 
pelled to limber up." After quoting the German writer, Thilo von 
Trotha, to the effect that “ the battery which fires with devastating 
power from a given position for only one minute will have been of 
more service, even though it may then be destroyed, than ten which 
keep up an almost innocuous cannonade from positions far in rear, 
however well selected they may be." The Prince implores his gunner 
comrades to remember and lay to heart these words in future cam¬ 
paigns. In general, he says, where all arms have cordially co-operated 
with one another losses are comparatively evenly divided amongst them, 
and uniformity of loss is the best evidence of co-operation. But at 
Plevna they fell upon the infantry in an altogether disproportionate 
manner. 
Daring the assault on the 11th the cavalry and artillery lost but 
2 per cent, of their numbers; "while, with the infantry, from 20 to 40 
per cent, fell, and many units left as many as half their strength on the 
field. Under different leadership, in days to come, cavalry and artillery, 
it is to be hoped, may be counted upon to support their comrades in a 
tenfold better manner, even if in doing so they too may sometimes 
suffer to the extent of 50 per cent. 1 * * 
The same 5th Battery, already referred to, seems rather plumed 
itself on its deeds of the 8th, and its journal records “that its losses 
show how well it performed its part." 
Now, Prince Kouropatkin critically examines the return of losses, 
which were considered so heavy as to justif} 7 the retreat of the guns, 
and it appears that on the 8th of September the 4th, 5th, and 6th 
batteries of the 16th Brigade suffered as follows :— 
Men 
Officers 
Men 
Killed. 
"Wounded. 
Wounded. 
4 tli Battery. 
. 0 
1 
6 
5th „ . 
. 2 
1 
7 
6th „ . 
. 0 
0 
8 
Total . 
.. ... 2 
2 
16 
That is to say, out of a total of 600 men 8 per cent, were hors de 
combat; or, of the 300 who formed gun detachments, 6 per cent. At 
the moment they limbered up they had not sustained their full loss 
either. 
1 The evidences of past campaigns and the deeds of some artillery detachments, even in 1877-78, 
notably at the Shipka Pass, where a loss of about 50 per cent, was met with stoical indifference, 
encourage him, he tells us, in his belief. 
2 
