10 
ACHIEVEMENTS OP FIELD AETILLERY. 
Compare this table with tbe returns of the regiment, Kaluga, whose 
advance the guns supported, and whose withdrawal they should have 
covered, which tell of 11 officers and 689 men, or 30 per cent, of the 
strength remaining after Lovtcha, and in some companies 60 per cent., 
killed and wounded. 
Prince Kouropatkin says he knew these batteries well, and that their 
soldierlike behaviour on other occasions tempts him to regard their 
behaviour on the 8fch as a momentary aberration of judgment. 
A further examination of returns, somewhat imperfect however, 
shows that these batteries lost more than any others. 
We need pursue a painful subject no further. The guns lost their 
opportunity and the confidence and respect of the other arms because, 
in the first instance, their role was not clearly defined by the General 
in chief command; because there was a lack of supervision and direction 
of fire on the part of their own senior officers; because many batteries 
were not eager to get to effective ranges; because they were afraid of 
musketry fire; because no steps were taken to protect artillery positions 
from that fire; because no effort was made to gradually occupy positions 
nearer to the Turks; because the flow of fire was not made to grow in 
volume as the supreme moment drew near, and, finally, because 186 
pieces were never brought into action at all. 
But why, it will be asked, have we devoted so much space to the 
discussion of episodes disgraceful rather than glorious for artillery ? 
Why delay, “infandum renovare dolarem” all over again? Why not let 
the incidents of Plevna be forgotten in the brighter story of Aladja 
Dagh ? 
Briefly, then, because it must be admitted that, if guns are to be 
credited with anything like their true value, it is necessary to explain 
Plevna away, and because many of the critics of the campaign of 1877 
have not hesitated to draw inferences most unfavourable to the future 
prospects of our arm from the experiences we have dealt with. 
And yet nothing new of any value was demonstrated by them. 
We might have prophesied before they occurred, with that confidence 
that springs from sure and certain knowledge, that, if tactics in general 
are faulty ; that, if those who direct the operations do not know their 
business; that, if gunners are trained to be afraid of musketry, and hang 
back; and that if guns are weak and ammunition is defective, we need 
look for no triumphs for artillery. If the German batteries had feared 
the Chassepot, or the Austrians the needle gun, as the Russians did the 
Peabody, might not Mars-la-Tour have been a French victory, and 
Koniggratz a complete rout ? And have we not all been told over and 
over again that the Prussian guns did nothing in 1866, and with better 
counsel did much in 1870 ? 
Even in the beginning of the war of 1877, where the employment of 
artillery was understood, there were occasions, moreover, when its per¬ 
formances were by no means despicable, and towards its close, when 
experience had been gained, they were more than once brilliant. 
Skobeleff, a leader with a genius for war, directed his batteries in a 
very different manner to what we have described, and his faith was so 
little shaken, even by what he saw at Plevna, that when he was sent 
