23 
DEFENCE OF A COAST FORTRESS. 
BY 
COLONEL J. B. RICHARDSON, R.A. 
(Lecture delivered to Senior Officers' Class ). 
Coast defence generally is a very large question, very little understood, 
and one which would take up a great deal more time than the half 
hour available. 
I propose, therefore, to take the matter up at a point where, in 
conformity with a larger scheme, it has been decided to place some 
particular port in a state of defence, either :— 
(a.) To protect docks. 
(b.) Or coaling stations. 
(c.) Or to afford a secure base for naval operations. 
[cl.) Or shelter to merchant shipping. 
(<?.) Or all, or any of these combined. 
Mere small attempts at military protection, against raids for the Protection 
purpose of levying contributions, hardly come under the heading of SaT mere 
Coast Fortresses, and would further demand much time. 
The successful defence of a sea fortress against attack by ships is Defence of 
largely a question of money. It is capable of being worked out before- question 0 a f 
hand, and differs in this respect from field operations, that the locality o a s ,;J’ e 
is fixed, and consequently that the conditions of attack and defence } v ° rkp d ou } 
vary little. 
The defence of a sea fortress depends less on personal fighting Depends less 
qualities and more on preparation than, perhaps, any other form of 
warfare. Consequently the defence becomes very technical. thanonpre- 
In fixing schemes of defence the nature and extent of probable conditions 
attacks must first be taken into consideration. °. f 
lo make preparations to defend a Coast Fortress against every considered, 
possible form of attack by land and sea is to propose a greater expen¬ 
diture than will probably ever be undertaken again. 
There are people who pin their faith in fortifications; and no doubt Fortifica- 
fortifications give a sense of security to the uninitiated. It must si°e 3 and pen * 
always be remembered, however, that permanent fortifications are very 
expensive, slow in construction, nearly equally slow in removal, and that 
they are generally more or less obsolete before they are entirely com¬ 
pleted. 
Also that an obsolete permanent fortification is apt to prove an obsolete 
absolute weakness to defenders. There it is, and they do not like to 
abandon it; even when conscious that it is leading them into a false 
line of defence. 
The great success which has attended the use of improvised defences improvised 
where serious land attack on a Coast Fortress has been undertaken fortlfiCAClons 
should have prevented a free hand being given to would-be Todlebens, 
in the case of our existing fortresses. But it is never safA to pro- 
1. VOL. XX. 
