24 
DEFENCE OF A COAST FORTRESS. 
Latest idea 
of fortress 
defences. 
Attack of 
sea fortress 
by fleets un¬ 
likely. 
Bombard¬ 
ment likely 
to be of 
short dura¬ 
tion. 
Landing _ 
{ Parties' like- 
y to be small 
Superiority 
of Coasi 
Fortresses 
over ships. 
pliecy ; and possibly a repetition of defences of this class may be 
occasioned by panic, or by some pushing department at bead-quarters, 
with money to spend. 
The latest (and apparently a very common sense) idea is that a Coast 
Fortress need only be kept prepared against what may be termed 
et Rush •” either by battle-ships, lighter craft, or by a naval landing 
force. More determined land attack being left to be met by a cover¬ 
ing army, kept in hand in a more or less central position, and moved 
in sufficient force to any point when it is seen that an attack is going to 
be systematically pushed home. 
Now-a-days ships can carry but few rounds for their larger guns ; 
the newer ships carry from 80 to 90 rounds, and after these are 
expended the ship is more or less useless for fighting purposes until 
she has replenished, a somewhat lengthy and difficult operation at sea. 
Unless, then, a fleet has such command of the sea as to render it 
impossible that it can be navally attacked for a considerable period, it 
is unlikely that it will attack a sea fortress. 
It follows that a bombardment of a Coast Fortress, duly prepared, 
will probably be but of few hours duration at any one time, but that 
time is entirely at the discretion of the ships, and an ill-organised 
garrison may be worn out almost without firing a shot. 
Less crew than of- old is accommodated on board a battle-ship ; 
while of that crew many are specialists who can ill be spared from 
the structure of the ship for landing purposes. Therefore any force 
landed for the purpose of rushing coast defences will be a small one. 
In our schemes of defence the probable extreme strength of such a 
landing party may be taken as not exceeding 2000 men. 
What a hostile fleet would attempt, would be the damage and destruc¬ 
tion of what the forts and mines are designed to guard, as opposed to 
the actual destruction of the forts. It is true that a complete destruc¬ 
tion of the mines and forts would leave the dockyard, coaling station, 
&c., at its mercy; but if only batteries and mines are intelligently 
placed their complete destruction is extremely improbable. The 
great value of ships as moving engines of attack, their vast cost, 
and the length of time it takes to replace them, renders it unlikely 
that they will ever be risked in the mere attempt to capture forts well 
prepared. 
Coast Artillery will have well justified its existence if it ever induces 
a ship to engage. 
Of late years the insistance of artillerymen that theirs should be the 
chief voice in the choice of positions for their batteries (though it has 
met with strenuous opposition), and the moral effect of submarine 
mines, has led, where high land exists, to a probably great superiority 
of Coast Fortress defences over battle-ships ; which are specially 
designed for the attack of their own kind, and, therefore, not for the 
attack of such fortresses, while it is improbable that vessels will be 
constructed for the mere attack of Coast Forts, as possibly each for¬ 
tress has peculiarities which would demand modification in the attacking 
vessels. 
The defence of fortresses which have no high land in their vicinity 
is a far harder nut to crack. Battle-ships are at their best when 
