ACHIEVEMENTS OP FIELD ARTILLERY. 
127 
dependant on the nervous organisation of the flesh and blood that 
carries it, and that, moreover, the measure of the most accurate rifle is 
also the measure of the chance it has of missing the object at which it 
is directed by a soldier in the excitement of close combat. The recruit 
who points the new small-bore an inch above the head of the foe in 
front of him may kill some driver of the baggage train in rear, but will 
assuredly not disable anyone of the fighting line who are thronging 
down upon him. 
That is why Kouropatkin said that his experience taught him that 
losses from the Turkish rifle fire were more severe at long than at close 
ranges. At the latter men lost their heads and let their rifles off 
wildly in the air, while, when the enemy was still distant, they aimed 
with deliberation. 
Prudence is the child of experience, and if the first results of the 
next fight on a large scale compel guns to keep at the immense ranges 
some enthusiasts advocate, there will probably be little difficulty in per¬ 
suading human nature to take care of itself. The teaching of history 
on the other hand distinctly tells us that danger lurks about a system 
which makes artillery think more of safety than execution, and it is 
encouraging to us to find that in the past the enterprise of the arm has 
grown greater with experience, and that the close of a campaign has 
found it more venturesome than it was at its commencement. 1 
With regard to the effect of artillery fire as evidenced by statistics, 
it seems right to say a few words as soon after the war of 1870, a good 
deal of misapprehension was abroad on the subject. The losses 
inflicted by the artillery in that campaign were frequently put down at 
10 per cent, or even lower still. Now these estimates were based on 
the returns of killed and wounded made by the victors, those of the 
beaten army not having in many cases been preserved at all. It may 
be conceded that on the German side the losses through artillery fire 
only amounted to 5 per cent. But in the face of the examples we have 
quoted of the manner in which the German guns distinguished them¬ 
selves, is there any cause for either shame or surprise in the admission? 
At Gravelotte something like one-third of the German losses took place 
in the Guard Corps which assaulted St. Privat, and the German bat¬ 
teries had so completely the upper hand of the French at this end of 
the line that the latter hardly dare show themselves at all, far less 
inflict loss on the assault. The same tale is told at the other extremity 
of the battle where the German infantry did not go forward until the 
enemy’s guns had been more or less crushed. Even at Mars-la-Tour, 
where the French had a vastly greater number of guns available than 
the Germans, the latter had always the best of the artillery combat, 
and it was the Chassepot and not field pieces that caused their severe 
losses, because the French batteries were continually compelled to 
shift their position by the overwhelming fire of those on the other side. 
1 The experiences of 1866 led the Germans to direct their batteries to endeavour to get to 
shorter ranges when taking the field in 187 ’. Lieut.-Colonel Hetcher, in his “ History of the 
American War,” says :—“The long range of their artillery was and has been on many occasions 
throughout the war, especially at its commencement, a disadvantage rather than a benefit to the 
Federal Army.” . . ..... “much time and ammunition was wasted in firing into woods, and at 
imaginary bodies of the enemy.” 
