128 
ACHIEVEMENTS OP PTELD ARTILLERY. 
If we turn to the French side, however, we find a loss of 25 per 
cent, from artillery fire admitted, and at Sedan it has been placed as 
high as 50 per cent. How inferior the projectiles made use of on both 
sides were to those with which batteries are now-a-days equipped we 
have already stated. 
It is further also to be noted that one effect of artillery fire, and that 
too a most important one, is altogether lost sight of by those who 
measure its performances by hits or even by its demoralising effect on 
a foe in position. The effect we allude to is that of artillery fire upon 
troops under cover either in villages or behind intrenchments. In the 
former case it quickly drives them out into the open, for buildings 
exposed to such fire are shunned as mere shell traps, and allows the 
infantry to seize with perhaps but slight loss what they would have 
paid dearly for assaulting unsupported. In the latter the enemy are 
held cowering below their parapets, and thus the infantry of the 
attack are enabled to get within striking distance without being 
exposed to the long range fire of the rifle which would surely otherwise 
demand heavy sacrifice from them. And so greatly has the value of 
the co-operation of guns been recognised under these latter conditions 
that it is anticipated by more than one authority that the increased use 
of intrenchments, which future campaigns will in all probability display, 
will demand a more liberal supply of Field Artillery than ever, and will 
increase rather than diminish the relative importance of the arm. 
Even at Plevna, faulty as were the tactics and disappointing the 
result as regards what artillery achieved, the Russian losses must have 
been far heavier but for their preponderance in the arm, and their 
opponents, though they may have crouched with comparative security 
under their head-cover, were yet held prisoners by the guns, and any 
efforts towards a counter-stroke were stifled by those field pieces, which, 
if they failed to produce more tangible results, were yet by no means 
ineffective in a manner less ostentatious but none the less real on that 
account. 
Thus we are enabled to close our record of what has been done with 
bright presage of what the days to come may bring to us. We have 
kept clear, as far as possible, of statistics and percentages from the 
practice ground. According to them, too, modern shrapnel may be 
shown as destructive as the most enthusiastic gunner can desire. 
But the appeal to the battle-field is more convincing and more reliable. 
The great principles remain immutable, it is only as regards their appli¬ 
cation that we need to change, and the same causes underlie the victories 
of an Alexander, a Napoleon, or a Lee. It was Napoleon, 1 perhaps the 
greatest exponent of the art of war, who specially recognised the value 
of a powerful artillery, and showed the world how to turn it into 
account. The secret of his success lay in this chiefly, that he perceived 
i‘* Napoleon’s attack on the Austrian centre at Wagram was prepared by 100 guns. It was on 
the lire of this tremendous battery that Napoleon chiefly counted to do the work. He was him¬ 
self an artillery officer, and lie placed great reliance in all his battles on that arm of the service.”— 
“ The First Napoleon,” by J. C. Ropes. 
“In taking the field in 1813 Napoleon had an extraordinary amount of artillery with the 
army. Napoleon recognising the fact that the presence of a battery is a great moral support to 
yaw •infantry.”—.** The First Napoleon,” by J. C. Ropes. 
