190 
THE STRATEGICAL GEOGRAPHY OF EUROPE. 
the Mincio. In 1800, when Morean was at Augsburg, Moncey was in 
the St. Gothard defiles, and Napoleon on the Po. In 1805, while Mack 
was in Bavaria, the Archduke Charles was in Lombardy. In 1809, 
while Napoleon was struggling against the Archduke at Aspern, Eugene 
was marching to his aid from the Adige. In 1866, when Prussia was 
attacking Austria in Bohemia, Victor Emanuel’s forces were operating 
against them in the Italian Quadrilateral. Such historical records show 
that the Triple Alliance against France and Russia is a matter depending 
on most weighty topographical and strategical considerations, which 
cannot be ignored, rather than on the intrigues of diplomatists, or the 
caprices of Kings. 
To turn to another branch of our subject. In 1870, the French had 
possession of the Vosges and the fortresses on the left bank of the Rhine 
from Huningen to the Lauter and also of Thionville and Metz. The 
Germans elected to concentrate on the Northern portion of the re-entering 
frontier formed by the Rhine as far as the Lauter, and thence to Sierck. 
The battles of Spicheren and Woerth compelled the French to fall back, 
some to Metz and others to Chalons. Of course, after their successes at 
Gravellotte and Sedan, there was nothing to prevent the invaders from 
investing Metz and Paris. After the investment of Paris, Gambetta’s design 
was to raise the seige, and also fall on the German communications, and 
for this purpose, vast levies were organized South of the Loire and North 
of the Somme, and no small activity was displayed in the Cote d’Or. But 
all his plans, strategetically true enough, were foiled by the manner in 
which, after the fall of Strasburg, Von Werder protected the line of 
communications by his operations along the Doubs and Ognon and 
Soane, and above all by the skilful fashion in which, after the fall of 
Metz, Prince Frederick Charles, with one part of the investing forces, 
marched to the Loire and the Sarthe, and Von Manteuffel, with another 
part, held the lines of the Somme and the River Seine. But in truth, 
the French forgot the teachings of history, and the principles of 
strategy till too late. If Gambetta had on his strategic lines the armies 
that surrendered at Sedan and Metz, I venture to say that the capital of 
France would not soon have surrendered.—The writings of Napoleon 
show that Paris is not the strategic centre of France. It was Orleans, 
not Paris that saved France from the English in the 15th century. The 
lines of the Seine and Marne and their affluents are of course of great 
value by way of resistance to the invaders ; but after all the great bulk 
of France is South of an arbitrary line drawn from Belfort to the Mouth 
of the Loire. See how fatal to the invader, moving from Metz and 
Strasburg Westward to Paris, would be a defence which would compel him 
to form front to flank to meet forces protected by the fortresses of Belfort 
and Besancon and Langres, and further protected by the Mountains of 
the Cote d’Or and by the Allier and the Loire, and with Lyons and the 
Rhone valley, and all the territory South of the Loire as a source of 
supply behind them. From Nevers to Besancon would be an excellent 
defensive-offensive line. The Map of France is now studded with 
great places of arms and with forts. It is to be feared that the French 
Engineers have with all these done much to compromise their nation. 
Field armies more than forts determine the fate of nations. Be this as 
it may and some excellent observations on the subject will be found in 
the appendix, it is a very clear that the results of the last war, from the 
point of view of military geography, have been most injurious to France. 
The outworks of France against Germany, having regard to the fact that 
