THE STRATEGICAL GEOGRAPHY OF EUROPE—APPENDIX, 195 
Strategic Position of Biserta. 
“The position of Carthage,” writes the “ Norddeutsche,” “ was with¬ 
out any doubt an incomparably more favourable one for maintaining 
command of the Mediterranean than that of Rome and its unimportant 
harbour of Ostia, and, indeed, it was owing to this favourable position, 
in conjunction with the statesmanship of its rulers and the activity and 
skill as seamen of its population, that the Punic capital was enabled to 
remain for so long the rival of Rome as mistress of those seas. 
“ Although not situated on the same site as old Carthage, the ruins 
of which lies some 8 miles off in a north-westerly direction in the 
neighbourhood of Cape Blanc, Biserta, the new base of the French 
Fleet in the Mediterranean, possesses a position for a war harbour so 
favoured by Nature that it not only vies with that of Carthage in every 
respect, but is superior in many points. A natural basin, over 2 
German miles long and 1 broad, with a uniform depth of 40-ft., 
completely secure both from the force of the sea and from a hostile 
bombardment; the harbour of Biserta connected with the sea by a 
navigable canal 7*5 km. long will afford shelter to all the fleets of the 
world. This canal has been dredged out to allow the passage of ships 
drawing 30-ft. Two huge moles, each 1 km. long, are intended to 
protect the entrance into the canal. The Gulf of Biserta forms an 
advantageous approach to the harbour for a fleet, while the steep lime¬ 
stone cliffs of the surrounding coast render the fortification of the 
whole locality and the mouth of the harbour easy, as also of the town 
of Biserta, which is situated on the plateau. The position, in fact, 
possesses exceptional advantages for the establishment of a first-class 
naval station.” 
With regard to the strategic importance of this new French stronghold, 
Biserta appears to occupy a far more central position than Toulon, and 
in consequence of their propinquity it directly threatens the south and 
south-western coasts of Italy, Sicily, and Sardinia in the event of war 
between the two countries ; in the second place, Biserta commands the 
great trade route from Gibraltar to the East, as well as of vessels 
proceeding to or coming from the Tyrrhenian Sea. 
From Biserta it is easy to reach Sicily in 12 hours, Naples in 36 hours, 
and Maddalena in 24 hours, and a French squadron could reach in 36 
hours any desired point on the coast of Sicily and most of the towns on 
the south-west coast of the peninsula and Sardinia. 
If then the transformation of Biserta into a war harbour and station 
for the French Fleet affects most materially the military situation as 
far as the southern and south-western coasts of Italy are concerned, 
it is no less a matter of importance to England that the trade route 
through the Mediterranean should be commanded from such a base of 
operation so close as Biserta is. 
The maritime position of Great Britain in the Mediterranean is 
threatened less by the fleets of her probable enemy than by the 
possibility afforded for the destruction of her trade and the interruption 
of the sea route to the East by ships issuing from secure harbours. 
Hostile squadrons will hardly be able to effect much against the strong 
fortresses of Malta and Gibraltar ; but by attacks on the swarm of 
merchant ships which, even in war-time, would be passing between the 
Suez Canal and Gibraltar, cruisers issuing from Toulon, Algiers, and 
especially Biserta, would be able to inflict untold injury upon English 
