196 THE STRATEGICAL GEOGRAPHY OF EUROPE—APPENDIX. 
trade. For such an onslaught on English ships by the French cruisers, 
Biserta affords a perfectly unique base. Formerly the possession of 
Gibraltar and Malta, and still later the occupation of Alexandra and 
Egypt, enabled England to command the route from the Atlantic to 
Suez ; but to-day Biserta rivals Gibraltar and Malta in this respect, and 
it may be confidently asserted that the completion of this newly- 
created stronghold in 1894, as is the intention of the French Govern¬ 
ment, will necessitate, on the part of England, a very considerable 
increase to her naval strength in the Mediterranean if she is to maintain 
her supremacy in that sea. 
The “ Neue Freie Press,” on the 1st of September last, calls attention 
to the same subject: “For some time past,” it says, “a wrathful 
feeling has shown itself in the Italian Press at the feverish haste with 
which the French are pushing on the completion of the fortifications 
and the harbour works at Biserta on the north coast of Tunis, which 
threaten alike the coasts of Sicily and Italy, Malta, and the English 
strategic route to India.— Commander G-abbett , R.N. 
The Fortresses of France. 
On the 1st of January, 1882, France had 147 strong places, or in¬ 
dependent forts, and 434 works, or detached batteries, that is 581 works 
of permanent fortification in all. In 1880 the French engineers 
estimated that the garrisons needful for all the fortresses of France 
would amount to at least 520,000 men, that is more than a 
fourth of the entire army of France as it then stood. The French 
engineers seem to think that the more works are constructed the more 
the security of the nation. Vauban, Napoleon, and Moltke held very 
different views. While not pretending to ignore the value of good 
fortresses, and being quite ready to provide them in reasonable 
abundance, their decided opinion was that the belligerent who is master 
in the field will either take, or evade, fortresses at his convenience. 
The best rampart for any country is a numerous, well disciplined, and 
well organized field army. The fewer the men who are shut up in forts 
the more powerful it will be. On the other hand fortresses are 
invaluable as delaying an enemy and giving time to a country to 
organize its resources. 
Major Clarke on French Fortresses. 
It is customary to speak somewhat slightingly of the performance of the 
French fortresses in the campaign of 1870-71. With a few exceptions they 
are commonly assumed to have fallen to brief bombardments by field guns, 
becoming thus available as illustrations of the power of rifled guns over 
fortifications, and indicating the necessity for armour in various forms 
together with other artifices dear to a certain class of mind. On the other 
hand, the fate of these fortresses has also been regarded as attesting the 
inefficacy of fortification generally, the uselessness of fortresses in face 
of the conditions of modern war. 
Political considerations determined the fatal movement to Sedan, 
therefore fortresses exercise a baleful attraction over armies. Metz, a 
great frontier place of arms, was quite unprovided for a blockade, 
therefore fortresses are now easily thus reduced. But for the fortresses, 
however, the Germans would have swept France clear of all organized 
