198 THE STRATEGICAL GEOGRAPHY OP EUROPE—APPENDIX. 
of the Vosges, and of the Jura, are not so formidable that they cannot 
be made more so by a good system of fortresses. 
Of all these frontiers, that separating France and Piedmont was best 
covered. The valleys of the Stura and Suza, the passes of Argentine 
and Mont-Genevre, and of Mont-Cenis—-the only ones considered 
practicable,—were covered by masonry forts ; and in addition, works of 
considerable magnitude guarded the issues of the valleys in the plains of 
Piedmont. It was certainly no easy matter to surmount these 
difficulties. 
These excellent artifical defences will not always prevent the passage 
of an army, because the small works which are found in the gorges may 
be carried, or the enemy, if he be bold, niay find a passage over some 
other route hitherto deemed impracticable. The passage of the Alps by 
Francis I., Napoleon’s passage of the Saint Bernard, and the Splugen 
expedition, prove that there is truth in the remark of Napoleon, that an 
army can pass wherever a man can set his foot, a maxim not strictly true, 
but characteristic of the man, and applied by him with great success. 
Other countries are covered by large rivers, either as a first line or as 
a second. It is, however, remarkable that such lines, apparently so 
well calculated to separate nations without interfering with trade and 
communication, are generally not part of the real frontier. It cannot 
be said that the Danube divides Bessarabia from the Ottoman Empire 
as long as the Turks have a foothold in Moldavia. The Rhine was 
never the real frontier of France and Germany : for the French for 
long periods held points upon the right bank, while the Germans were 
in possession of Mayence, Luxembourg, and the tetes de ponts of 
Manheim and Wesel on the left bank. 
If, however, the Danube, the Rhine, Rhone, Elbe, Oder, Vistula, Po, 
and Adige, be not exterior lines of the frontier, there is no reason why 
they should not be fortified as lines of permanent defence, wherever 
they permit the use of a system suitable for covering a front of 
operations. 
An example of this kind is the Inn, which separates Bavaria from 
Austria : flanked on the south by the Tyrolese Alps, on the north by 
Bohemia and the Danube, its narrow front is covered by the three 
fortified places of Passan, Braunau, and Salzburg. Lloyd, with some 
poetic license, compares this frontier to two impregnable bastions whose 
curtain is formed of three fine forts and whose ditch is one of the most 
rapid of rivers. He has exaggerated these advantages, for his epithet of 
“ impregnable ” was decidedly disproved by the bloody events of 1800, 
1805, and 1809.—■“ The Art of War,” Jomini, ch. in., art. xxvi. 
Defensive System of France. 
Si le sort des armes etait, neanmoins, au debut, contraire aux armees 
fran 9 aises, elles eprouveraient, avant tout, le besoin de se rallier apres la 
defaite et de se renforcer pour reparer leurs pertes. Quelle serait, dans 
ce cas, la direction la plus avantageuse qu’elles devraient chercher agagner 
dans leur retraite ? 
II y a, pour elles, cinq lignes de retraite possibles. Ce sont : 
1° Sur Paris et Brest, directement a l’ouest; 
2° Sur Lille, vers le nord, pour res ter sur le flanc de la ligne de 
communication de l’envahisseur; 
