“Naval 
Warfare,” 
by Admiral 
Colomb. 
346 GOLD MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY, 1893 . 
Ifc is shown conclusively, and proved from numerous historical 
examples, by Admiral Colomb, in his exhaustive work, “ Naval War¬ 
fare/’ that before any attacks on sea-girt territory can be successful, 
or satisfactory, the Power making such attack must, at any rate 
temporarily, hold the command of the surrounding sea. This command 
of the sea will have to be established before the attack on territory can 
be undertaken, and maintained so long as the Land Forces are on 
foreign soil. 
Now a modern ship can hardly be built and equipped during the con¬ 
tinuance of a modern war. There is, therefore, no possibility of 
replacing casualties to ships by building others, and as the command 
of the sea must, ceteris paribus , depend upon the number of ships of 
war that each Power can maintain afloat, the value of each individual 
vessel is enhanced, far beyond its intrinsic value, great as this may be. 1 
Under circumstances of a near equality in naval strength, the sudden 
destruction, or even total disablement, of two or three large ships 
might be a disastrous blow to the Power thus struck. It is not difficult 
to imagine combinations which might bring about this near equality. 
From the foregoing considerations the following inferences may be 
safely drawn:— 
(1.) Without waiting for pitched battles, or fleet actions on a large 
scale, the destruction , or capture , of individual ships , as soon as possible, 
is the objective of the first importance to a Toner attaching a maritime 
nation . 
(2.) The possibility of replacing lost or badly damaged ships dur¬ 
ing the time of war being so small, both sides ivill hesitate 3 even more 
than formerly , before they risk their more valuable vessels in attempting 
to attack fixed defences. 
Coast Fortresses exist in a great measure for the purpose of acting 
as points d’appui for fleets. They generally contain, and are intended 
to protect, a dockyard, stores and coal, together with ships in various 
stages of preparedness for service, both men-of-war and colliers. 
Modern ships cannot keep the sea for months together, as could the 
old sailing ships of former days, and, in war time, they must have 
protected bases from which to operate, where they can take shelter, 
take refuge, refit, and replenish supplies. These bases are furnished 
by the Coast Fortresses. 
It may be considered as a certainty that, in time of war, Coast 
Fortresses will constantly have under their protection valuable ships 
building, fitting out, repairing, or coaling. These ships will be the primary 
objects of attack , and their protection will be the primary duty for which 
the defenders of such fortresses will be held responsible. 
A ship in port, in a state of comparative unpreparedness, is, in many 
ways, a more vulnerable object than a ship in full war trim on the high 
seas, and an additional reason for attacking ships in port is the profound 
1 Since the above was written, the following words, spoken in the House of Commons on the 7th 
of this month (March 1893) by Lord George Hamilton, the ex-First Lord of the Admiralty, show 
that the opinion of one whose judgment in these matters must be regarded with the highest 
respect, is quite in agreement with the view here expressed—“ It must be recollected that, if we 
engaged in a really serious war, the command of the sea really rested with that Power which had 
the most battle-ships and the most fighting power.”— Standard, March 8th, 1893, 
