GOLD MEDAL PEIZE ESSAY, 1893 . 
347 
political and moral effect which, would be produced on a nation by the 
sudden destruction of their valuable ships in their very ports, and 
behind the shore defences. 
The deliberate attack, on a large scale, of a Coast Fortress, with a 
view to its actual capture or destruction, not only requires, as shown 
by Admiral Colomb, a fully commanded sea, but is besides an operation 
of great magnitude, demanding all the resources of a great State, and 
demanding some time for preparation. The difficulties of our own 
Baltic fleet in 1854, and those of the French fleet in 1870 in effecting 
anything, even when they held the command of the sea, show how 
difficult it is for a sea force, alone, to seriously injure a nation through 
its shore defences. Even an attack with a view to the mere destruction 
of works is, so far as present experience goes, in many ways wasteful, 
the results hardly being commensurate with the expenditure, while the 
risk to big ships venturing into narrow hostile waters must be very 
great. 
The bombardment of the works of Alexandria by our fleet in 1881 
is a modern and most interesting example of how little really can be 
effected by a fine fleet, operating in a sea over which it has undisputed 
command, against indifferent works, on low sites, indifferently armed 
and manned, and unassisted by any auxiliary defence, such as torpedo 
boats or mines. 
It is therefore quite unlikely that, at any rate at the commencement 
of a war, either side would feel itself in a position to attempt an attack 
on any fixed defences on a large scale. There remains then for con¬ 
sideration, attempts to bombard dockyards at long ranges, and attempts 
to destroy ships by other methods. The former partakes of the nature 
of a deliberate attack on works. The latter will be considered first. 
In the American Civil War, in 1861, the Confederates were fitting “The Naval 
out the schooner “ Judah ” in Pensacola Navy Yard to prey upon ft 8 eS f 
Federal commerce. The Confederates believed her to he so safe that no A "5j a p” r fj 
naval force would attempt to cut her out. The vessel lay alougside the u.s.x. 
wharf, to which she was secured by chains. She was manned and 
armed with three guns, and on shore two more guns (one of them a 
10-inch) were mounted to command her decks and the wharf, while no 
less than 1000 troops were kept in and about the yard. 
The Federal Commodore considered the destruction of this vessel of so 
much importance as to warrant the risk of a failure and the loss of men. 
At 3 a.m. on September 14th, 1861, an expedition of 100 men in 
four boats was despatched from the Federal frigate Ci Colorado.” The 
crew of the schooner were found at quarters and ready to repel boarders. 
Two of the boats made for the shore, and this party successfully spiked Subsidiary 
the two guns there mounted. The other two made for the schooner Attack * 
and, after a sharp fight, drove her crew ashore. Finding it impossible to 
move the vessel she was successfully set on fire. The boats made good 
their retreat. The schooner burnt to the waters edge, floated away, 
and sank. 
The above incident took place little more than thirty years ago. It 
has been selected as comprising in small compass several most valuable 
lessons to be referred to hereafter, 
