GOLD MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY, 1893 . 
351 
That the change of conditions caused by these modern speeds has 
scarcely yet been thoroughly realised, is proved, not only by the sur¬ 
prise of the fleet at Plymouth, 1 but by the surprise of the “ Blanco 
Encalada.** There is no doubt that the Captain of the latter, having 
trustworthy information that the two Government ships were some 400 
miles distant on the previous day, neglected precautions, which he 
would have taken had he realised that they were within striking 
distance. 
Section II. On the General Principles wniCH Govern 
the Attack. 
(1.) Good information is absolutely necessary, before planning an 
attack, as to the names and numbers of the ships in each harbour, and 
where they are lying, their state of preparedness or otherwise. The 
strength, composition, and morale of the garrisons of the forts, the 
number, nature, positions, and mountings of the guns, and how fought, 
whether by P.F. or other systems. The exact position of the P.F. cells 
for both guns and mine-fields — search-lights lohere placed —position of 
Brennan torpedo station and how defended. Good charts of the 
channels and harbours, and pilots if possible. The general character 
of the defence contemplated, whether by guard-boats, mines, &c., &c.—• 
if the latter, the exact position of the mine-fields and where the shore 
ends of the cables are led ashore. &c., &c. Most of this information is 
probably available to our possible enemies. The recent conviction of 
a N.-C.O. of the Royal Engineers for selling plans of a fortress to the 
French will be recollected in this connection. It may be remarked 
here, en parenthese , that it is high time that our laws increased the 
punishment for such offences—the present maximum of 12 months* 
imprisonment is miserably inadequate. 
(2.) Speed and Secrecij are essential, these were the secrets of 
Napoleon, and no words can express the importance of the former. In 
these days an hour or two more or less may be of inestimable value— 
even 30 years ago, the value of a few hours is strikingly illustrated by 
the case of the “Merrimac** and the “Monitor.** In the American “Naval His- 
Civil War the Confederates were building the formidable armoured civif war/* 
ram “ Merrimac,** while the Federals had on the stocks the turret craft by p^jjf al 
“Monitor,** the only vessel likely to be able to cope with the “Merrimac.** 
A month before the “ Monitor ** was to be launched, the Confederates, 
through their spies, learned the exact condition of the vessel, and the 
day on which she would probably be put into the water, and, in conse¬ 
quence of this information, strained every nerve to complete the 
“Merrimac** first, doubling the number of workmen, and working 
both by day and by night. The result was that, on March 8th, 1862, 
the “Merrimac** attacked the Federal wooden fleet, sank the “Cumber¬ 
land,** burnt the “Congress,** and had the fleet at her mercy, when at 
8 p.m. that evening the “Monitor** appeared on the scene, and pre¬ 
vented the “Merrimac** from doing any more mischief. Those few 
1 It is fair to the Admiral of this fleet to state that he mentioned to his ships the 'possibility of 
torpedo boat attack, hut expressed some doubt as to whether the rules of the manoeuvres would 
admit of it. The ships were certainly caught in a faulty position and more or less unprepared. 
