GOLD MEDAL PBIZE ESSAY., 1893 . 
353 
(6.) No attack must ever he attempted hy a single unsupported boat. 
An interesting instance of this occurred during the war between Chili 
and Peru in April 1880. The Peruvian corvette “Union” was lying 
moored in the harbour of Callao. She was surrounded by a stout 
boom. A Chilian torpedo boat, fitted with spar torpedoes, was sent to 
attach the “Union,” but on her way came into collision with a fishing 
boat, and one of her two spars was broken. Nevertheless the boat 
made for the “Union,” and, finding her surrounded by the boom, ex¬ 
ploded her other spar torpedo against the latter, destroying a portion 
of it, and opening a clear way to the ship. Having, however, no other 
torpedo available, and no consort to take advantage of the opening thus 
made , this boat had to retire, without effecting anything, at the moment 
when success was assured, had a consort been present. The success 
due to combined action is illustrated by the sinking of the “ Blanco 
Encalada ” previously quoted. 
The attack by torpedo boats should be exactly similar to an attack 
by cavalry. The boats should act in several successive lines, following 
one another in pairs, or threes if possible, and slightly echeloned. By 
this means P.F. predictions, if lost, as they probably will be, with 
reference to the boats for which they were intended, will be of no use 
for the following lines. This point will be referred to later. Even if 
the leading boats get destroyed or disabled, yet success may be attained 
by those following, while the knowledge of support, and witnesses , close 
behind, must nerve the leaders, as also the knowledge that in case of a 
breakdown assistance is at hand. 
(7.) Every advantage must he taken of meteorological conditions .—Prob¬ 
ably few of us landsmen fully realise the stupendous importance to 
both Attack and Defence of meterological conditions. The most 
obvious instance is the difference between daylight and darkness, but 
everyday incidents, such as fog, haze, rain, the state of the sea, the 
tides, direction and force of wind , and state of the atmosphere ivith reference 
to the hanging of smoke , are all factors of immense importance, and it is 
not saying too much to affirm that the success or failure of an enter¬ 
prise may depend upon the use made of these natural conditions. For 
instance, during daylight, a good or bad light for aiming is chiefly 
dependant upon the position of the sun with reference to the various 
objects, and this is partially the case even when the sun itself is not 
visible. At Alexandria the low morning sun was full in the eyes of the 
gun-layers of the fleet, the batteries being in shadow, while the men in 
the latter viewed the ships brightly illuminated against a dull back¬ 
ground. In a morning attack on say Plymouth, it would, therefore, be 
advantageous to select the western defences of the sound, which face 
more or less eastwards, for attack, rather than those on the other side. 
The effect of fog is completely paralysing to the Defence, but an 
active attacker will utilise it specially to injure submarine defences. 
1laze and mist are modified fogs, and are far more troublesome to the 
Defence than to the Attack, on account of their effect upon telescopes , 
which form parts of certain instruments upon which the gun power of 
the Defence greatly depends. A very moderate haze, such as would 
afford little obstacle to navigation, has considerable effect upon tele- 
“ United 
States Naval 
Intelli¬ 
gence,” War 
Series II., 
1833 . 
