358 
GOLD MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY, 1893. 
the Attach has immense advantages. It knows its own mind, chi ^ses 
its own time, object, and atmospheric conditions, starts fresh to its 
work, employs its best and most dashing officers and men, and is a 
manageable force. On the other hand, the Defence is crippled by its 
very complexity, the extent of ground it covers (often such as makes 
rapid communications, or passing of men from point to point extremely 
difficult), the multiplicity of its details, and the colossal difficulty, 
apparently not yet properly realised in our country, of ensuring con¬ 
certed action between the several sections of the Defence, some in the 
hands of the Navy, some in those of the Artillery, and some in those 
of the Engineers. Further, this concerted action cannot be rehearsed 
in time of peace, except at great cost, so the Defence may be said to 
be practically untrained at the outbreak of hostilities. Its officers and 
men, too, will be largely composed of auxiliary forces, certainly unable, 
at any rate at first, to compete, in these days of rapid movement and 
action, with the dash and speed of the Attack. 
The Attackers, too, being presumably Naval men, besides being in 
training, have far more experience of practical work under varying 
meteorological conditions than the defenders—a knowledge which must 
give a still further advantage. 
And also the morale and discipline of the garrisons and covering 
forces will inevitably be a source of trouble to the Defenders. Men, 
especially those only partially trained, cannot be always kept screwed 
up to a high pitch of vigilance and discipline. Crowded into confined 
works, the novelty wall soon wear off. The nervous tension produced 
by constant anticipation of attack, especially if attack does not come, 
must be followed by relaxation. It will probably be found necessary 
to relieve the garrisons entirely every 12 or 24 hours. 
If, therefore, the golden moment for attack, viz., the very commence¬ 
ment of hostilities, be, for any reason, not taken advantage of, it will 
be best for the attackers to refrain from mere attempts to harass the 
garrisons. Frequent attacks, especially if not pushed home, must be 
a positive advantage to the garrisons, as giving to the men excitement, 
interest, and occupation, and to the officers, practice, and opportunities 
of finding out their weak points. Far more harassing to the Defence 
will be the dead monotonous silence, the wearisome suspense, the feel¬ 
ing that an attack is always impending yet never coming, which must 
lower the spirits and energy of the garrisons. Fixed defences cannot 
take the offensive, or even compel the enemy to come and attack them, 
though they are themselves always open to attack. Their garrisons 
have thus a morally inferior position and will be dimly conscious of it. 
Finally, the tendency of most modern improvements has been in the 
all-important subject of speed , not only of movement, but also of fire, 
and it must be admitted that the Attack has benefited far more from 
these improvements than has the Defence. 
The state of things obtaining at this moment, in the matter of the 
relations between the Defence and Attack of Coast Fortresses, bears a 
striking resemblance to the condition of the military nations of Europe, 
before the bursting upon them of the armies of the French Republic, 
and the inauguration of a new era in things military. We read in 
