GOLD MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY, 1893. 
359 
History how the slow cumbrous methods of land warfare, traditional, 
and in vogue, up to the time of the French Revolution, were suddenly 
completely upset by the new style of warfare of the French armies 
whose celerity of movement , and consequent rapid striking power , gave 
them their enormous advantage over their slower, and less alert op¬ 
ponents. Somehow the state of Coast Defence in relation to the Attack 
at the present moment strongly recalls this position. The Defence 
compared with the Attack is wanting in speed . What then is to be 
done ? 
Section IY. On the Measures Required to Place the Defence 
on a Level with the Modern Attack. 
It is hoped that a few suggestions on this point will not be considered 
out of place. The subject is of great importance to artillerymen, as a 
failure to cope successfully with the Attack, should a disaster unfor¬ 
tunately happen, would not only cast great discredit on the Defence 
generally, but a considerable portion of it would, rightly or wrongly, 
be thrown upon those manning the Forts. 
1st.—First and foremost, then, it is necessary to mention the pres¬ 
sing need for greater unity of command. With us, at present, the 
responsibility for the Defence of Coast Fortresses is shared between the 
Naval and Military authorities. In Germany, on the contrary, this duel 
system has been abolished, and the Navy alone is responsible for the 
Coast Defences, and the same change appears to have been carried out 
by the French recently. There can be no doubt as to which system 
would work most smoothly in time of stress, and it is greatly to be 
hoped that it may be found possible to introduce it. 
It is impossible to have written the foregoing without being impressed 
with the fact, which has probably also struck the reader, that the con¬ 
siderations bearing on the subject of this essay are chiefly of a naval 
character. This is of itself a strong argument in favour of entrusting 
the Defence to the Naval authorities. 1 
The proposed change would be one of great magnitude and need not 
be further discussed here. 
For the present we must suppose that things remain as they are, and 
the problem is how, under present arrangements, is the greatest unity 
of command to be attained. 
In the first place, then, it is necessary that an officer of high rank 
should be deputed by the Commander-in-Cbief of a Coast Fortress to 
be in entire charge of all the sea defences. The Commander-in-Chief, 
himself, has multifarious duties constantly requiring his attention, and 
it is most necessary that the commander of the sea defences should be 
able to give his whole mind to his special department. He should be 
1 That this subject has been under the consideration of the late Admiralty, was stated by Lord 
George Hamilton in the speech of 7th inst., quoted above. He said :— 
“ But there was one point in our defence to which he desired to call particular attention, and 
that was the part the Army and Navy were to take in it. Every country, except our own, 
entrusted to the Navy and not to the Army, the defence of great Naval ports and stations. To 
entrust their defence to the Army was a wrong system. ..He was very anxious 
that, if the House wished it, nothing should be done by either the Admiralty or the "War Office to 
impede a gradual transfer of the defence of Naval ports and stations from the Army to the Navy.”— 
Standard, March 8th, 1893. 
