374 
SILVER MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY, 1893 . 
Coast defence vessels with ramming power may render blockade diffi¬ 
cult, but cannot well take much part during a bombardment, except as 
floating batteries, without masking the forts. An example was given 
at Cherbourg during the French Naval Manoeuvres, 1892. 1 2 
Torpedo boats and other floating defences have the same drawback, 
and meeting them with their like will only form incidents of the battle. 
Submarine mines and dirigible torpedoes will only be met with in 
channels and somewhat enclosed waters, or, if an attempt is made to 
employ them in the open they will only affect the question of range and 
anchoring. The case of Charleston, where submarine mines were used 
in front of the forts, is no exception, because the long bar gave the 
approach to the harbour all the characteristics of a channel. 
It may be safely asserted that no serious bombardment of properly 
grouped, gun-ed, and garrisoned forts is possible without especially 
constructed vessels and much preparation, including the seizing of a 
suitable base of operations at no great distance. In the American War, 
for the attack of Charleston, the monitors had to be built, and Port 
Royal seized as a base. In the Crimean War the only effective action 
against forts was that of the specially built French ironclads, which re¬ 
duced the casemated fort at Kinburn. 3 
Such a preparation involves complete command at sea. Without 
this condition the attack is limited in its nature by (1) Time ; (2) Coal ; 
(3) Ammunition; and is only likely to be undertaken by a small 
squadron. 3 
It is limited by time, because it is clear that the attack must be free 
from interruption, as was illustrated at Lissa, in 1866. 4 
It is limited by coal because the ships must be able to reach a depot, 
or colliers must be free to reach them. 
It is limited by ammunition as its supply is what is carried, and suffi¬ 
cient must be kept for the naval action which is more or less certain. 
When Rooke took Gibraltar, which was only garrisoned by 150 men, 
he so far depleted his ships of ammunition that he actually risked the 
loss of the battle of Malaga which followed. 5 The Italian fleet would 
have been in far better a position to meet the Austrian at Lissa if it 
had not been engaged previously in a two days* bombardment of forts. 6 
Colonel J. B. Richardson, R.A., in a recent lecture 7 said :—"It may, 
however, I think, be accepted that under existing conditions Coast 
Fortresses, which are known to be reasonably ready, will not be 
exposed to an Artillery engagement other than at quite long range, 
partaking of the nature of a reconnaissance to ascertain their prepared¬ 
ness. If found in a really bad state of preparation, such as might be 
expected quite at the beginning of a war, ships, which have no hostile 
fleet behind them may attempt the bombardment of Coast Fortresses 
1 French Naval Manoeuvres, 1892; Garbet. E.U.S. Institution Journal. Vol. XXXVI. 
2 Ships versus Forts; Jackson. R.E. Occasional Papers, 1889. 
2 Naval Prize Essay, 1892 ; Craigie. E.U.S, Institution Journal. Vol. XXXVI. 
4 Attack on Lissa, 1866; Lewis. R.E. Occasional Papers. Vol. IX. 
2 Naval Prize Essay, 1892; Craigie. E.U.S. Institution Journal. Vol. XXXVI. 
6 Attack on Lissa, 1866 ; Lewis. E.E. Occasional Papers. Vol. IX. 
7 Defence of a Coast Fortress ; Richardson. “ Proceedings,” E.A. Institution. Vol. XX. 
