376 
SILVER MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY, 1893 . 
At Port Royal, 7th November, 1861, Fort Walker was silenced at 
ranges of from 600 to 800 yards. 
At Charleston, 7th April, 1863, the monitors engaged at ranges of 
from 500 to 1000 yards. 
At the shelling of Fort Wagner, preparatory to the land assault on 
18th July, 1863, the fort maintained its fire from 12.30 to 4 p.m. while 
the range was 1200 yards, but was at once silenced when the ships 
moved in to 300 yards. 
At Fort Fisher, in January, 1865, the ranges varied from 800 to 2400 
yards. 
It must be remembered that in examples from the American War the 
ironclads were impenetrable at the ranges, and that the broad-side 
ships had an overpowering superiority in mass of fire to the forts, which 
were all on low sites. When things were more equal it did not pay to 
get too close, as the river flotilla found at Fort Donelson, on 13th Feb¬ 
ruary, 1862, after its success at Fort Henry, eleven days before. 
We may assume that the ranges will be as short as they can be with¬ 
out incurring too great injury to the effective target; and these ranges 
will probably be far less than might be supposed from formula for 
penetration, and the theoretical perfection of range-finding instruments. 
Annoyance and moral effect will generally be the aim, and long ranges 
will be used rather for the searching effect they give to the projectiles 
than for avoidance of injury to the ships. 
The amount of injury it is allowable to incur depends on the distance 
from the fleePs base, whether the ship or ships can be spared for the 
necessary time of repair, and the prospects of a naval action to follow. 
More might have been attempted on the Atlantic coast in the American 
Civil War if it had not been necessary to maintain the blockade. At 
Lissa, the disablement of the Formidable contributed to the Italian 
defeat. 
Colonel Lewis remarks 1 2 regarding Alexandria : “Long ranges were 
used probably because it was desired to keep the ships ready for sub¬ 
sequent action, and the possibility of silencing the guns at them, in 
consequence of the known bad quality of the gunners.” 
At Alexandria it may be questioned whether less injury would not 
have been received if the outside squadron had been taken early to 
shorter ranges, for the in-shore squadron had the fewer hits. 
It can seldom, in a bombardment, be worth while to expose the ships 
to very great injury, because the results obtainable are too small. 
At Fort McAlister, 3 3rd March, 1862, 209 heavy shell were fired ; 2 
guns were dismounted and large craters cut in the parapets and 
traverses, “but still no injury was done that could not be readily re¬ 
paired during the night.” At Charleston, 3 on 7th April, 1863, 43 shot 
and 96 shell only produced 14 casualties although the works were 
struck 69 times. On this occasion 5 out of 7 monitors were disabled, 
and the iron ship KeolcuJt received 90 hits, of which 19 were penetrations 
on or below her water-line, which caused her to sink as soon as there 
1 Fortification for English Engineers ; Lewis. 
2 The Navy in the Civil "War. 3 Vols. Soley, Aminen, Mahan. 
3 The Navy in the Civil War. 3 vols. Soley, Ammen, Mahan. 
