SILVER MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY, 1893 . 
379 
varies with range; (b) an alteration of speed varies the allowance for 
time of firing; (c) alterations of direction upsets “ predictions 39 and 
often varies the deflection required ; and (d) the necessity of frequently 
changing the assignment of targets to the forts or “ groups 33 may very 
well produce confusion unless the officers of the Defence have had much 
more practice than is at all likely. 
Steaming up to a buoy at a known range, though as far as the 
Defence is concerned it is much the same as anchoring, may be the 
better method for some ships. Captain Jackson says: 1 2 “ In the 
absence of means of quickly ascertaining and communicating the range, 
any rapid movement on the part of the attacking ships is out of the 
question, or if carried out, must entail bad shooting and waste of ammu¬ 
nition. The numerous instances already given show that to maintain 
an effective fire a ship must be at anchor. The excellent practice made 
by the Inflexible at Alexandria may be quoted in opposition to this 
theory, but the peculiar armament of that ship must be taken into 
account. The Inflexible carried four 16-inch R.M.L. guns, and eight 
20-pr. R.B.L. guns. The lighter guns were therefore wholly insignifi¬ 
cant in comparison with the heavier. The ship carried no secondary 
armament, in the sense in which the term is now understood. The 
four heavy guns took some time to load, and their fire was naturally 
delivered in salvos, with considerable intervals. The policy of keeping 
the ship moving, and steaming to an ascertained position to fire, seems 
to have been the natural outcome of her armament. Such a plan 
would probably not have been followed had she had a secondary arma¬ 
ment of 6-inch guns, such as is now usually carried by battle-ships.” 
Weighing the evidence, it seems probable that unless the Defence is 
known to be bad in material or personnel, a bombardment will be begun 
with the ships under weigh, and that if it appears possible to silence 
the forts, then to do that the ships will go in to short ranges and 
anchor. 
Of course, when co-operating with a land force, as will usually be 
the case, there can be no particular object to be gained by silencing 
the guns on the sea faces. It will be sufficient to annoy the gunners 
on the land faces, who will be taken in flank or rear, or to sweep the 
ground outside the works in order to prevent sorties. Under these 
circumstances great accuracy of fire is not necessary, and it is unlikely 
the ships will either anchor or close to short range, unless they have 
an overwhelming superiority in mass of fire. 
Another point in connection with the manoeuvring of the ships under 
fire is the position individual ships should place themselves in with 
regard to the trajectories of the guns they are engaging. 
Rear-Admiral S. Long, R.N., in a recent lecture 3 said: “ In many 
cases of actions between single ships and of ships engaging forts there 
would be an advantage open to one opponent by maintaining the 
position as much as possible in which he presented an oblique target to 
his enemy, and this especially at the beginning of an action, when all 
1 Ships verstis Forts ; Jackson. R.E. Occasional Papers, 1889. 
2 Probable Influence of Quick-firing guns on Naval Tactics and Construction j Long. R.TJ.S. 
Institution Journal. Vol. XXXVI, 
