Silver medal prize essay, 1893. 
383 
4. The Most Suitable Time for the Attach. 
There can be no doubt that, except for annoyance or attracting 
attention from an attempt to penetrate the water area of a fortress with 
torpedo boats, a bombardment at night is perfectly useless, and the ex¬ 
penditure of ammunition will always prevent one; though such a 
manoeuvre is a pretty sight and will often form a part of peace exercises. 
The earlier in the day a serious bombardment is commenced the 
better, because it will always take a considerable time to produce any 
effect, and if the garrison is worth anything, the task, if not finished, 
will have to be begun afresh next day. The ships will always be able 
to retire when they desire. 
Tidal currents may affect the exact hour, as a strong one setting in 
towards the forts might carry a temporary disabled ship into a position 
she could not get out of. Besides some ships can fight better bow on 
and this would be difficult on the flow. At the attack on Grand Gulf, 
Mississippi, on 29th April, 1863, the gun boats actually ran past the 
batteries at very short ranges in order to gain the advantage of fight¬ 
ing with their heads up stream. 1 2 
Smooth weather is necessary for the ships* fire to have any accuracy, 
and is moreover desirable because, as the Director of Naval Construc¬ 
tion has pointed out, 3 a ship rolling heavily may be struck below her 
armour. 
A light breeze blowing landwards is favourable as long as ordinary 
powder is used, because the smoke will bother the fort gunners, and to 
some extent the ships will escape from the interference of each others* 
smoke. 
Forcing a Passage. 
This, as Captain Jackson has noted, 3 does not mean forcing the 
entrance of a harbour, the inner waters of which are under the fire of the 
defences, for in that case the ships would gain nothing ; and the risk of 
their defeat and capture in their cramped position would make such an 
enterprise unjustifiable. 
But, if there is undefended water beyond the defences as at Mobile 
Bay, the aim may well justify the risk, for it is pretty certain that no 
number of shore batteries will alone be able to prevent the ships 
passing. 
It may be urged that no example, since the introduction of range 
and position-finders, quick-firing guns, electric lights, and means and 
methods of fire control, exists; but it is clear that the only way arti- 
lery can prevent a ship*s passage is by injury to her engines or steering 
gear, and the chances of a ship escaping such injury are very great, 
and in most cases they may be made greater, or the effects of the 
injuries neutralised by proper arrangements. 
The example of the Keokuk at Charleston shows how hard it is to 
sink or stop the weakest of ships. At Mobile the disabled Oneida was 
1 The Navy in the Civil War. 3 vols. Sole.y, Ammen, Mahan. 
2 Attack of Armour-clad Vessels hv Artillery ; Orde Browne. K.TJ.S. Institution Journal. Vol. 
XXVI. 
3 Ships versus Forts; Jackson. B.E. Occasional Papers, 1889. 
