384 
SILVER MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY, 1893. 
carried past the fort by the gun-boat lashed alongside of her. 
Such being the case it is clear that the conditions are very different 
to those governing the conduct of a bombardment, but the tactics to be 
pursued can be discussed under similar heads, with the addition of a 
fresh one, which requires to be taken first, viz.: 
1. The Dealing with Obstructions. 
Unless the attack has recent and reliable information, it will be 
necessary to closely reconnoitre a channel before making an attempt 
to force it, because even a slight check to the leading ship may cause 
great confusion, if not disaster. Of this there was a clear illustration 
at Mobile Bay, 5th August, 1864, where the stopping of the Brooklyn 
would have blocked the channel, and probably have put the fleet at the 
mercy of the Confederate ram Tennessee, but for the coolness and 
courage of Admiral Farragut, who took his ship, the Hartford, out of the 
column and over the submarine mines. 
The reconnaissance will undoubtedly have to be carried out in boats 
under the cover of darkness, unless the forts are so obsolete and so 
badly manned that their fire can be completely silenced by a bombard¬ 
ment delivered from outside the channel; and even then if the channel 
be narrow musketry fire will make a daylight reconnaissance impossible. 
Obstructions vary from simple entanglements like those at the 
entrance to Charleston north of Fort Sumter, to sunken ships, as at 
Sebastopol, or they may be submarine mines. 
Some may be impassable or only removable with an outlay of con¬ 
siderable time, in which case the forts must be captured and the 
operation ceases to be one of simply forcing a passage. 
Others it may be possible to get through, and in this class may be 
included submarine mines. This will be denied by some, and the 
examples of the Fatapasco , the Tecumseh, and other ships sunk by mines 
in the American Civil War will be quoted, but all these cases were 
those of weakly built hulls without water-tight compartments, and their 
bottoms were actually blown in. With modern ships and mines, the 
effect expected is the disablement of the machinery by the shock, and 
not the actual sinking of the ship, but even this is doubtful when it is 
remembered that such weak constructions as the Weehawhen at Charles¬ 
ton, and the Montauh at Fort McAlister, were actually lifted by the 
explosion of mines without injury. There appears to be no example of 
ships being injured by a simple shaking. 
The British Navy has an elaborate system of counter-mining, but no 
other has, 1 and as such an operation undoubtedly requires much pre¬ 
paration, including the establishment of a base in the vicinity of the 
place attacked, it is unlikely to be undertaken. 
Submarine mines are generally credited with exerting a great moral 
effect, even when the local conditions are most unfavourable to their 
use, bub this will be worth nothing at all if a Farragut commands the 
attack. 
1 Submarine Mines; Clarke. “ Proceedings,” E.A, Institution, Vol. XVII. 
