SILVER MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY, 1893 . 
385 
2. The Range at which the Ships will Engage. 
This will usually be decided by the conditions of navigation. Bat, 
if there is a choice, the nearer the ships can pass the forts the better, 
because the arcs of fire of the guns will be more quickly got through, 
and the ships will derive the full benefit of their secondary and aux¬ 
iliary armaments, while the danger to the “ vital target ” is not great 
enough to outweigh these advantages. 
3. The Formation of the Passing Fleet. 
There appears to be only one formation for navigating a channel, 
viz. : that of line head. 
Even at New Orleans, where forts on each side had to be engaged 
and were assigned to different divisions, the fleet was formed in a single 
column. 
At Vicksburg, on 28th June, 1862, the gun-boats formed a separate 
column on the outside of, and covering the intervals of, the main one; 
but at Port Hudson, on 15th March, 1863, Farragut, with his previous 
experience, formed the two columns into one by lashing the gun-boats 
to the ships, which were slightly in echelon to facilitate end-on fire as 
the batteries were approached. 
At Mobile, it is true, the monitors formed a separate column between 
the fort and the other ships, which were arranged as at Port Hudson, 
but it is certainly an open question whether it would not have been 
better to have had them at the head of the main column. They would 
have been in a better position to deal with the Tennessee , and the other 
ships would Lave had more room in the channel. 
For the sake of mutual support the closest order admissible will 
generally be adopted. Bear-Admiral B. V. Hamilton, C.B., says i 1 
“ In attacking forts under weigh very close order must be kept.” Farra¬ 
gut passing Vicksburg remarks : te If the ships had kept in close order 
in all probability they would have suffered less, as the fire of the whole 
fleet would have kept the enemy from his guns a longer space of 
time, and when at his guns his fire would have been more distracted.” 
The arrangement of lashing the smaller vessels on the outside of the 
larger ones greatly lessens the chance of the important ships being 
stopped, and leads one to ask if colliers and other comparatively cheap 
vessels could not be lashed on the fighting side, or both sides if required, 
to act as bursting screens for the projectiles of the defence ? 
Could not such ships be also used as e< forlorn hopes” to clear the 
way through mine-fields at night ? If built with water-tight compart¬ 
ments, or especially prepared, they would not sink before they had been 
moved out of the way of the following warships. 
4. The Manoeuvring of the Ships During the Passage. 
Under this head there are two points, the speed and the nature of 
the fire. 
As to speed, the highest compatible with the safe navigation of the 
channel and the co-operation of the ships seems to be the best, but the 
qualification is very necessary for the examples of the Mississippi and 
1 Naval Operations during the Ciyil War in the United States; Hamilton. li.U.S. Institution 
Journal. Vol. XXII. 
