386 
SILVER MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY, 1893 . 
Mobile Bay clearly show that the dangers from navigation and con¬ 
fusion in the squadron far exceed those from the action of the Defence. 
It is worthy of note that at the Devonport Court-martial on the 
stranding of the Howe some officers expressed the opinion that large 
ships with twin screws can be more safely navigated in narrow waters 
at a speed of four or five knots than at a faster. 
Uniformity of speed is to be expected, as any change is likely to 
produce confusion. 
As to the nature of fire ; the immediate object being to avoid injury 
'to the ships, and the best method of attaining it being to keep down 
the fire of the forts, the secondary armament, and the auxiliary if the 
ranges are suitable, will be used. 
If the passage is made under cover of dusk or darkness and the fire 
of the forts is ineffective, it may often be better not to fire at all, 
because the smoke may increase the difficulties of navigation as was the 
case at Port Hudson but in other cases the veil of smoke may be of 
great use in hiding the vessels. 
5. The Most Suitable Time for the Passage. 
Captain Jackson on this says, 3 Admirals Farragut and Porter evi¬ 
dently considered that ships had a better chance of slipping past in 
the dark, and to obtain the immunity from the enemy’s fire which 
obscurity afforded, were ready to encounter the risks to navigation, 
which are unavoidable in a night action.Yet the results 
of their action show that the passage of a narrow channel in the dark 
was a mistake. The case of a broad channel, which presents no diffi¬ 
culties of navigation, is different.Here, if a ship or 
squadron wished to force a passage, darkness or fog would be chosen. 
In clear daylight there would be a chance of passing without being 
hit. In even moderate mist, still more in darkness, there would be a 
certainty of passing without injury. Now on the other hand, consider 
a position like Vicksburg fortified according to modern ideas 
No water battery would be found unless it were a dummy erected for 
the purpose of diverting the fire of the ships from more important ob¬ 
jects. Along the shore would be placed numerous electric search-lights, 
which would brightly illuminate the passing ships, dazzle the eyes of 
their Captains, and at the same time render the guns on the heights 
above invisible. The search-lights on board the ships would only add 
to the confusion. Without exaggeration, if is not improbable that the 
search-lights, judiciously used, might alone prevent the passage of the 
ships, and that the latter would devote themselves, as a preliminary 
operation, to extinguishing the lights by machine gun fire. Under 
these circumstances would not an Admiral prefer daylight to darkness ? 
Would it not be better to expose ships to the enemy’s fire than to the 
risk of grounding under the batteries ? Farragut’s squadron in the 
battle of Mobile Bay, suffered little from the fire of Fort Morgan, 
though he passed it in daylight.However, looking 
1 The Navy in the Civil War. 3 vols. Soley, Ammon, Mahan. 
2 Ships versus Forts ; Jackson. E.E. Occasional Papers, 1889. 
