SILVER MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY, 1803. 
387 
at the matter from the Artilleryman’s point of view, no general rule 
can be laid down as to the probable time for an attempt of this nature. 
The passage of a clear channel, however strongly defended by batteries, 
may be effected at all times of day and night and in any sort of weather. 
Ships can only be stopped by obstructing a channel to such an extent 
as to delay them under fire.” 
In fog dirigible torpedoes cannot be used, and in darkness their effec¬ 
tive use is uncertain, which sometimes may be of very great importance 
to the attack. 
LANDINGS, TORPEDO-BOAT RAIDS, &c. 
If the foregoing deductions concerning the attack and passing of 
forts by ships are correct, it is clear—the offensive powers of the ships 
being so small and their risks of disablement so large—that some form 
of land attack in co-operation will nearly always be made, if the capture 
of the forts is the object in view or is necessary to ensure success. 
This form of attack remains much the same as when so often prac¬ 
tised in the West Indies 1 and elsewhere in the last century, for, as 
Rear-Admiral P. H. Colomb 2 has pointed out, steam though it may 
shorten the passage of the boats from the ships to the shore, has not 
otherwise altered the conditions of the enterprise. 
Although in some cases where the heavy broadsides of the ships 
were able to silence the weak shore batteries, landings were made close 
to the works, the lesson we received at Camaret Bay, 3 near Brest, as 
far back as 1694 holds good, and is strengthened by the relative power 
of ships and forts at the present day. A landing cannot take place in 
a defended area. 
Sheltered landing places are necessary, for an open beach presents 
too many risks, because a very slight surf may make disembarkation 
impossible. The army was landed in the Crimea on an open beach, 
but the operation was one contrary to the teaching of experience, and 
itself illustrated the risks incurred. 
When the attack is on a large scale, directly the land forces are in a 
position to act, the ships play a secondary role . They complete the in¬ 
vestment and give such assistance with their guns as the circumstances 
admit. 
Small parties may be landed either as a preparatory measure 
(Hatteras Inlet) or incidently during the attack (Alexandria), but in 
either case surprise is necessary for success, unless the troops of the 
Defence are very bad or have been thoroughly demoralised. A check 
to the attack generally means disaster. Louisburg, Cape Breton, in 
1745, Petropaulowski in the Crimean War, Peiho River, in 1859, Port 
Sumter, 8th September, 1863, and later the French abortive action at 
the mouth of the Tam Sui, are perhaps sufficient examples. 
This necessity for surprise appears to limit such attempts to very 
small dimensions, and to render the often-suggested enterprises with 
1 Annual Registers. 
2 Military and Naval Operations; Colomb. Lecture 34, Aldershot Military Society, 1891. 
3 Military and Naval Operations ; Colomb. Lecture 34, Aldershot Military Society, 1891. 
